activity
20162026
most citedTransaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers

2 citations · 4 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

12 papers

cs.CR2026

Crypto x AI, AI x Crypto: A Survey

Sarah Allen, Pranay Anchuri, James Austgen +22

The intersection of crypto x AI is spawning papers, products, online posts, and companies. All the surrounding buzz, though, obscures what exactly has been done, what the opportuni…

cs.GT2026

Adversarial procurement in blockchains

Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, S. Matthew Weinberg

An emerging blockchain protocol design pattern leverages the asymmetry between the computational effort in performing versus verifying tasks. For example, cryptographic validity pr…

cs.GT2025

Selfish Mining under General Stochastic Rewards

Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, S. Matthew Weinberg

Selfish miners selectively withhold blocks to earn disproportionately high revenue. The vast majority of the selfish mining literature focuses exclusively on block rewards. Carlste…

cs.GT2024

Resonance: Transaction Fees for Heterogeneous Computation

Maryam Bahrani, Naveen Durvasula

Blockchain networks are facing increasingly heterogeneous computational demands, and in response, protocol designers have started building specialized infrastructure to supply that…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

Centralization in Block Building and Proposer-Builder Separation

Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden

The goal of this paper is to rigorously interrogate conventional wisdom about centralization in block-building (due to, e.g., MEV and private order flow) and the outsourcing of blo…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Undetectable Selfish Mining

Maryam Bahrani, S. Matthew Weinberg

Seminal work of Eyal and Sirer (2014) establishes that a strategic Bitcoin miner may strictly profit by deviating from the intended Bitcoin protocol, using a strategy now termed *s…

cs.GT2023★ 2 cited

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers

Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden

The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards e…

cs.GT2023

When Bidders Are DAOs

Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden

In a typical decentralized autonomous organization (DAO), people organize themselves into a group that is programmatically managed. DAOs can act as bidders in auctions, with a DAO'…

cs.DS2021

Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem

Maryam Bahrani, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Sahil Singla +1

Babaioff et al. [BIK2007] introduced the matroid secretary problem in 2007, a natural extension of the classic single-choice secretary problem to matroids, and conjectured that a c…

cs.GT2019

Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees

Maryam Bahrani, Nicole Immorlica, Divyarthi Mohan +1

We study information aggregation in networks where agents make binary decisions (labeled incorrect or correct). Agents initially form independent private beliefs about the better d…

math.CO2017

Split-Decomposition Trees with Prime Nodes: Enumeration and Random Generation of Cactus Graphs

Maryam Bahrani, Jérémie Lumbroso

In this paper, we build on recent results by Chauve et al. (2014) and Bahrani and Lumbroso (2017), which combined the split-decomposition, as exposed by Gioan and Paul, with analyt…

math.CO2016

Enumerations, Forbidden Subgraph Characterizations, and the Split-Decomposition

Maryam Bahrani, Jérémie Lumbroso

Forbidden characterizations may sometimes be the most natural way to describe families of graphs, and yet these characterizations are usually very hard to exploit for enumerative p…