32 citations · 121 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Envy-Free Division of Land
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim +1
Classic cake-cutting algorithms enable people with different preferences to divide among them a heterogeneous resource (``cake''), such that the resulting division is fair accordin…
SBBA: a Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented the first dominant strategy truthful mechanism for double auction. His mechanism attains nearly optimal gain-from-trade when the market…
Demand-Flow of Agents with Gross-Substitute Valuations
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
We consider the class of valuations on indivisible items called gross-substitute (GS). This class was introduced by Kelso and Crawford (1982) and is widely used in studies of marke…
Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. Existing mechanisms are…