34 citations · 429 across the 66 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preference Domains
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi +1
We study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient, strategyproof…
Coordinating Charitable Donations with Leontief Preferences
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi +1
We consider the problem of funding public goods that are complementary in nature. Examples include charities handling different needs (e.g., protecting animals vs. providing health…
Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Cake cutting is a classic fair division problem, with the cake serving as a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible resource. Recently, it was shown that for any number of players w…
How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player receiv…
Fairness for Multi-Self Agents
Sophie Bade, Erel Segal-Halevi
We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete…