activity
20142026
most citedDemocratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods

34 citations · 429 across the 66 of their papers we have counts for

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51 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2026

Individual Fairness in Budget Aggregation

Xiaohui Bei, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger +3

We consider the problem of aggregating individual distributions over alternatives into a collective distribution, also known as budget aggregation. Existing fairness notion…

cs.GT2026

Perpetual Fully-Online Approximate Fairness

Ido Kahana, Erel Segal-Halevi, Noam Hazon

Many decision processes run for a long and unknown duration: in each round new requests arrive, an irrevocable choice must be made immediately, and the system is judged by ongoing…

cs.GT2025

How Do People Evaluate Non-Ideal Budgets? Evidence from Pairwise Comparisons

Ayelet Amster, Lioz Akirav, Rica Gonen +1

Budget aggregation allows citizens to express their ideal budget allocations, which a predetermined rule combines into a collective allocation. Existing theoretical work on budget-…

cs.GT2025

Efficiently Computing Equilibria in Budget-Aggregation Games

Patrick Becker, Alexander Fries, Matthias Greger +1

Budget aggregation deals with the social choice problem of distributing an exogenously given budget among a set of public projects, given agents' preferences. Taking a game-theoret…

cs.GT2025

Fair Allocation with Money: What is Your Objective?

Noga Klein Elmalem, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi

When allocating indivisible items, there are various ways to use monetary transfers for eliminating envy. Particularly, one can apply a balanced vector of transfer payments, or cha…

cs.GT2025

Fairly Wired: Towards Leximin-Optimal Division of Electricity

Eden Hartman, Dinesh Kumar Baghel, Erel Segal-Halevi

In many parts of the world - particularly in developing countries - the demand for electricity exceeds the available supply. In such cases, it is impossible to provide electricity…

cs.GT2025

Fair Allocation of Improvements: When Old Endowments Shape New Assignments

Noga Klein Elmalem, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi

This work is motivated by a common urban renewal process called Reconstruct and Divide. It involves the demolition of old buildings and the construction of new ones. Original homeo…

cs.GT2025

Whoever Said Money Won't Solve All Your Problems? Weighted Envy-free Allocation with Subsidy

Noga Klein Elmalem, Haris Aziz, Rica Gonen +7

We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where…

cs.GT2025

It's Not All Black and White: Degree of Truthfulness for Risk-Avoiding Agents

Eden Hartman, Erel Segal-Halevi, Biaoshuai Tao

The classic notion of \emph{truthfulness} requires that no agent has a profitable manipulation -- an untruthful report that, for \emph{some} combination of reports of the other age…

cs.GT2024

Improved Maximin Share Approximations for Chores by Bin Packing

Jugal Garg, Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi

We study fair division of indivisible chores among agents with additive cost functions using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations do not al…

cs.GT2024

Weighted Envy Freeness With Bounded Subsidies

Noga Klein Elmalem, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi

We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where…

cs.GT2024

Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization

Eden Hartman, Yonatan Aumann, Avinatan Hassidim +1

Two prominent objectives in social choice are utilitarian - maximizing the sum of agents' utilities, and leximin - maximizing the smallest agent's utility, then the second-smallest…

cs.GT2023

Computing approximate roots of monotone functions

Alexandros Hollender, Chester Lawrence, Erel Segal-Halevi

Given a function f: [a,b] -> R, if f(a) < 0 and f(b)> 0 and f is continuous, the Intermediate Value Theorem implies that f has a root in [a,b]. Moreover, given a value-oracle for f…

cs.GT2023

Efficient Almost-Egalitarian Allocation of Goods and Bads

Israel Jacobovich, Erel Segal-Halevi

We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents with different valuations, which can be positive or negative. An egalitarian allocation is an allocation that maximiz…

cs.GT2023

Leximin Approximation: From Single-Objective to Multi-Objective

Eden Hartman, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann +1

Leximin is a common approach to multi-objective optimization, frequently employed in fair division applications. In leximin optimization, one first aims to maximize the smallest ob…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling

Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi

We consider allocating indivisible chores among agents with different cost functions, such that all agents receive a cost of at most a constant factor times their maximin share. Th…

cs.GT2022

Fair Division Algorithms for Electricity Distribution

Dinesh Kumar Baghel, Vadim E. Levit, Erel Segal-Halevi

In many developing countries, the total electricity demand is larger than the limited generation capacity of power stations. Many countries adopt the common practice of routine loa…

cs.GT2022★ 6 cited

Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints

Hila Shoshan, Erel Segal-Halevi, Noam Hazon

We consider the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible items (goods or bads) under capacity constraints. In this setting, we are given a set of categorized items.…

cs.GT2022★ 4 cited

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores

Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of m indivisible chores (items with non-positive value) to n agents. We consider the desirable fairness notion of 1-out-of-d maximin…

cs.GT2021★ 8 cited

Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited

Mithun Chakraborty, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong

We revisit the setting of fairly allocating indivisible items when agents have different weights representing their entitlements. First, we propose a parameterized family of relaxa…

cs.GT2021★ 10 cited

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods

Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi

In fair division of indivisible goods, -out-of- maximin share (MMS) is the value that an agent can guarantee by partitioning the goods into bundles and choosing the $\…

cs.GT2021

Graphical Cake Cutting via Maximin Share

Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong

We study the recently introduced cake-cutting setting in which the cake is represented by an undirected graph. This generalizes the canonical interval cake and allows for modeling…

cs.GT2021★ 4 cited

Keep Your Distance: Land Division With Separation

Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong

This paper is part of an ongoing endeavor to bring the theory of fair division closer to practice by handling requirements from real-life applications. We focus on two requirements…

cs.GT2020★ 12 cited

Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation

Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong

We study the problem of fairly allocating a divisible resource, also known as cake cutting, with an additional requirement that the shares that different agents receive should be s…