3 citations · 7 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2016★ 2 cited
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler +2
A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for extracting revenue: when selling a single item to bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d.…
cs.GT2016
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler +2
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some , $v(S…
cs.GT2016★ 3 cited
Simple Mechanisms For Agents With Complements
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern +1
We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. [DMSW15] introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of $O(\log m)…