3 citations · 7 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Practical Multi-Task Learning for Rare Conversions in Ad Tech
Yuval Dishi, Ophir Friedler, Yonatan Karni +2
We present a Multi-Task Learning (MTL) approach for improving predictions for rare (e.g., <1%) conversion events in online advertising. The conversions are classified into "rare" o…
DCN^2: Interplay of Implicit Collision Weights and Explicit Cross Layers for Large-Scale Recommendation
Blaž Škrlj, Yonatan Karni, Grega Gašperšič +8
The Deep and Cross architecture (DCNv2) is a robust production baseline and is integral to numerous real-life recommender systems. Its inherent efficiency and ability to model inte…
Price Stability and Improved Buyer Utility with Presentation Design: A Theoretical Study of the Amazon Buy Box
Ophir Friedler, Hu Fu, Anna Karlin +1
Platforms design the form of presentation by which sellers are shown to the buyers. This design not only shapes the buyers' experience but also leads to different market equilibria…
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
The endowment effect, coined by Nobel Laureate Richard Thaler, posits that people tend to inflate the value of items they own. This bias was studied, both theoretically and empiric…
99\% Revenue via Enhanced Competition
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein
A sequence of recent studies show that even in the simple setting of a single seller and a single buyer with additive, independent valuations over items, the revenue-maximizing…
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler +2
A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for extracting revenue: when selling a single item to bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d.…
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler +2
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some , $v(S…
Simple Mechanisms For Agents With Complements
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern +1
We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. [DMSW15] introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of $O(\log m)…