6 citations · 10 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers · 1 filter
Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and Hardness
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Peter McGlaughlin +1
We study the computational complexity of finding a competitive equilibrium (CE) with chores when agents have linear preferences. CE is one of the most preferred mechanisms for allo…
Polynomial Time Algorithms to Find an Approximate Competitive Equilibrium for Chores
Shant Boodaghians, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Ruta Mehta
Competitive equilibrium with equal income (CEEI) is considered one of the best mechanisms to allocate a set of items among agents fairly and efficiently. In this paper, we study th…
Maximizing Nash Social Welfare in 2-Value Instances
Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Martin Hoefer +6
We consider the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare when allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents. We study instances, in whic…
Nash Social Welfare for 2-value Instances
Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Kurt Mehlhorn +2
This paper is merged with arXiv:2107.08965v2. We refer the reader to the full and updated version. We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with 2…
Improving EFX Guarantees through Rainbow Cycle Number
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn +2
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is arguably the most compelling f…
Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Peter McGlaughlin +1
We study the fair division problem of allocating a mixed manna under additively separable piecewise linear concave (SPLC) utilities. A mixed manna contains goods that everyone like…