11 citations · 13 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers
Non-Linear Pricing Restores Tractability for a Data Seller
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma +1
We consider a data seller who designs pricing mechanisms over multiple datasets to maximize revenue from budget-constrained buyers. The seller offers multiple datasets and assigns…
Equilibrium Pricing in Oligopolistic Data Markets
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma +1
We study equilibrium pricing in oligopolistic data markets with budget-constrained buyers (e.g., machine learning companies purchasing data to improve model accuracy) and strategic…
A Simple Polynomial-Time EFX Repair for Cancelable Valuations
Hannaneh Akrami, Arash Ashuri, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury +2
The leximin++ proof of Plaut and Roughgarden for agents with identical monotone valuations gives a natural EFX-repair procedure: starting from an arbitrary partition, repeatedly tr…
Fully Distributed Tâtonnement for Chores Markets
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta +1
We study price-adjustment dynamics for computing competitive equilibria (CE) in Fisher markets with chores. Unlike in classical goods markets, prices in chores markets are payments…
Competitive Equilibrium in Labor Economies through the Lens of Goods and Chores Fisher Markets
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta +2
In this paper, we study a two-sided labor market that couples the classical Fisher market with goods and the Fisher market with bads into a single unified framework. In our model,…
Revenue-Optimal Pricing for Budget-Constrained Buyers in Data Markets
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma +1
We study revenue-optimal pricing in data markets with rational, budget-constrained buyers. Such a market offers multiple datasets for sale, and buyers aim to improve the accuracy o…
Tâtonnement Dynamics for Fisher Markets with Chores
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta +1
In this paper, we initiate the study of tâtonnement dynamics in markets with chores. Tâtonnement is a fundamental market dynamics, capturing how prices evolve when they are adjuste…
Human-AI Collaboration with Misaligned Preferences
Jiaxin Song, Parnian Shahkar, Kate Donahue +1
In many real-life settings, algorithms play the role of assistants, while humans ultimately make the final decision. Often, algorithms specifically act as curators, narrowing down…
On the Existence and Complexity of Core-Stable Data Exchanges
Jiaxin Song, Pooja Kulkarni, Parnian Shahkar +1
The rapid growth of data-driven technologies and the emergence of various data-sharing paradigms have underscored the need for efficient and stable data exchange protocols. In any…
On the Theoretical Foundations of Data Exchange Economies
Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg +1
The immense success of ML systems relies heavily on large-scale, high-quality data. The high demand for data has led to many paradigms that involve selling, exchanging, and sharing…
Competitive Equilibrium for Chores: from Dual Eisenberg-Gale to a Fast, Greedy, LP-based Algorithm
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta +1
We study the computation of competitive equilibrium for Fisher markets with agents and divisible chores. Competitive equilibria for chores are known to correspond to the no…
Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores with Surplus
Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg +2
We study fair division of indivisible chores among agents with additive disutility functions. Two well-studied fairness notions for indivisible items are envy-freeness up to on…
Fairness in Federated Learning via Core-Stability
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Linyi Li, Mintong Kang +2
Federated learning provides an effective paradigm to jointly optimize a model benefited from rich distributed data while protecting data privacy. Nonetheless, the heterogeneity nat…
Maximizing Nash Social Welfare in 2-Value Instances: Delineating Tractability
Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Martin Hoefer +6
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents with \emph{2-value additive valuations}. In this setting, each good is valued either or $p/q…