5 papers
Pricing Pandora's Boxes: Revenue Maximization in Sequential Information Acquisition
Shuchi Chawla, Dimitris Christou, Trung Dang +1
We study a mechanism design problem in which a seller controls access to information about a set of stochastic alternatives, and a buyer sequentially acquires information in order…
Deterministic Refund Mechanisms
Saeed Alaei, Shuchi Chawla, Zhiyi Huang +2
We consider a mechanism design setting with a single item and a single buyer who is uncertain about the value of the item. Both the buyer and the seller have a common model for the…
Multi-Unit Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities
Shuchi Chawla, Trung Dang, Zhiyi Huang +1
We consider a combinatorial auction setting where buyers have fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations over the items and the seller's objective is to maximize the social welfare.…
Robust Max Selection
Trung Dang, Zhiyi Huang
We introduce a new model to study algorithm design under unreliable information, and apply this model for the problem of finding the uncorrupted maximum element of a list containin…
A Multi-Dimensional Online Contention Resolution Scheme for Revenue Maximization
Shuchi Chawla, Dimitris Christou, Trung Dang +3
We study multi-buyer multi-item sequential item pricing mechanisms for revenue maximization with the goal of approximating a natural fractional relaxation -- the ex ante optimal re…