61 citations · 329 across the 74 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Non-quasi-linear Agents in Quasi-linear Mechanisms
Moshe Babaioff, Richard Cole, Jason Hartline +2
Mechanisms with money are commonly designed under the assumption that agents are quasi-linear, meaning they have linear disutility for spending money. We study the implications whe…
Maximizing Welfare with Incentive-Aware Evaluation Mechanisms
Nika Haghtalab, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier +1
Motivated by applications such as college admission and insurance rate determination, we propose an evaluation problem where the inputs are controlled by strategic individuals who…
Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
We study equilibria in two-buyer sequential second-price (or first-price) auctions for identical goods. Buyers have weakly decreasing incremental values, and we make a behavioural…
An O(log log m) Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions
Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier
Prophet inequalities compare the expected performance of an online algorithm for a stochastic optimization problem to the expected optimal solution in hindsight. They are a major a…
Black-box Methods for Restoring Monotonicity
Evangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos
In many practical applications, heuristic or approximation algorithms are used to efficiently solve the task at hand. However their solutions frequently do not satisfy natural mono…
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski +2
We consider a robust version of the revenue maximization problem, where a single seller wishes to sell items to a single unit-demand buyer. In this robust version, the seller k…