61 citations · 329 across the 74 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2009★ 4 cited
Beyond Equilibria: Mechanisms for Repeated Combinatorial Auctions
Brendan Lucier
We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We…
cs.GT2009★ 26 cited
Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier
The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational…
cs.GT2009
Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions
Brendan Lucier, Allan Borodin
We consider auctions in which greedy algorithms, paired with first-price or critical-price payment rules, are used to resolve multi-parameter combinatorial allocation problems. We…