42 citations · 109 across the 39 of their papers we have counts for
19 papers · 1 filter
Online Fair Division with Upgrade Recourse
Yichen Huang, Nicholas Teh
We study the online fair division of indivisible goods. In the standard model, where assignments are irrevocable, no algorithm can guarantee any positive fraction of the maximin sh…
Minimizing Cumulative Envy in Allocating a Sequence of Items
Paul W. Goldberg, Isaac Robinson, Nicholas Teh
We study temporal fair division with indivisible goods that arrive sequentially and must be allocated irrevocably. In contrast to the usual online model, we assume that valuations…
Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting with Ranked Preferences
Noam Hazon, Leora Schmerler, Nicholas Teh
We study proportional representation in temporal voting, where one candidate is selected in each round. While prior work has focused on approval ballots, we consider ranked prefere…
Online Fair Division under an Oblivious Adversary
Saar Cohen, Nicholas Teh, Michael Wooldridge
We study online fair division, where indivisible goods arrive one at a time and must be allocated immediately and irrevocably among agents. Against an oblivious adversary t…
Full Justified Representation in Temporal Voting: Efficient Computation and Verification
Nicholas Teh
In temporal voting, a fixed set of voters makes a collective decision in each of several rounds, and proportionality requires that groups with shared interests be represented acros…
Maximin Share Allocations Beyond Weakly Lexicographic Valuations
Nicholas Teh
We study the fair division of indivisible goods among agents with nonnegative additive valuations. An agent's maximin share (MMS) is the value she can guarantee by partitioning the…
Strengthening Proportionality in Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities
Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh
Proportional representation is a central goal in participatory budgeting, where voters select public projects subject to a shared budget. Full justified representation (FJR) accoun…
Closing Gaps in Online Fair Division
Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh
We study the online fair division of indivisible items, where items arrive one at a time and must be allocated immediately and irrevocably. We address three central open questions…
Weighted Fair Division of Indivisible Mixed Manna
Nicholas Teh
We study weighted fair division of indivisible mixed manna under additive valuations. First, we resolve the general existence open question for weighted envy-freeness up to one ite…
Online House Allocation with Subsidy
Nicholas Teh, Saar Cohen, Karen Frilya Celine +2
House allocation is a fundamental problem in which each agent is assigned exactly one house. While the classical model assumes that all houses are available before the allocation i…
Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Mixed Manna: Tractable Settings
Kui-Wang Choi, Minming Li, Nicholas Teh
We study temporal fair division of indivisible mixed manna. Items arrive over time and must be allocated irrevocably; an item may be a good for some agents, a chore for others, and…
Strengthening Full Justified Representation: Efficient Verification and Computation
Nicholas Teh
Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest known satisfiable proportionality axioms for approval-based committee elections. Recent work has shown that an FJR commit…
Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO
Nicholas Teh
We study whether strictly positive marginal values restore the compatibility of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Pareto optimality (PO) for indivisible goods. For two agents,…
Online Fair Division with Budget Constraints
Saar Cohen, Nicholas Teh, Paul W. Goldberg +1
We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints. Goods arrive one at a time and must be assigned irrevocably to a feasible agen…
Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations
Florian Brandl, Warut Suksompong, Nicholas Teh
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible goods with binary valuations. In this setting, the maximum Nash welfare rule, the leximin rule, and all additive welfarist rules with…
The Price of Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting
Nicholas Teh
We study proportional representation in the temporal voting model, where collective decisions are made repeatedly over time over a fixed horizon. Prior work has extensively investi…
Efficient Ensemble Selection from Binary and Pairwise Feedback
Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh, Je Qin Chooi +2
Organizations increasingly deploy multiple AI systems across task domains, but selecting a small, high-performing ensemble can require costly model calls, benchmark runs, and human…
Learning Unanimously Acceptable Lotteries via Queries
Davin Choo, Paul W. Goldberg, Nicholas Teh
Many high-stakes AI deployments proceed only if every stakeholder deems the system acceptable relative to their own minimum standard. With randomization over a finite menu of optio…
The Cost of EFX: Generalized-Mean Welfare and Complexity Dichotomies with Few Surplus Items
Eugene Lim, Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is a central fairness notion for allocating indivisible goods, yet its existence is unresolved in general. In the setting with few surplus items,…