42 citations · 109 across the 39 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Persuading a Credible Agent
Jiarui Gan, Abheek Ghosh, Nicholas Teh
How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the…
Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints
Edith Elkind, Ayumi Igarashi, Nicholas Teh
We study fair allocation of indivisible chores to agents under budget constraints, where each chore has an objective size and disutility. This model captures scenarios where a set…
Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Items
Edith Elkind, Alexander Lam, Mohamad Latifian +2
We study a fair division model where indivisible items arrive sequentially, and must be allocated immediately and irrevocably. Previous work on online fair division has shown impos…
Multiwinner Temporal Voting with Aversion to Change
Valentin Zech, Niclas Boehmer, Edith Elkind +1
We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are interested in i…
Temporal Elections: Welfare, Strategyproofness, and Proportionality
Edith Elkind, Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh
We investigate a model of sequential decision-making where a single alternative is chosen at each round. We focus on two objectives -- utilitarian welfare (Util) and egalitarian we…
Envy-Free House Allocation with Minimum Subsidy
Davin Choo, Yan Hao Ling, Warut Suksompong +2
House allocation refers to the problem where houses are to be allocated to agents so that each agent receives one house. Since an envy-free house allocation does not always…