36 citations · 167 across the 66 of their papers we have counts for
27 papers · 1 filter
Query-Based Committee Selection
Itay Asher Zimet, Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Nimrod Talmon
Purpose: Multiwinner voting rules typically require full knowledge of voter preferences, which becomes impractical in large-scale or attention-limited settings. This paper investig…
Adjusted Winner: from Splitting to Selling
Robert Bredereck, Bin Sun, Eyal Briman +1
The Adjusted Winner (AW) method is a fundamental procedure for the fair division of indivisible resources between two agents. However, its reliance on splitting resources can lead…
How Similar Are Two Elections?
Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko +3
We introduce and study isomorphic distances between ordinal elections (with the same numbers of candidates and voters). The main feature of these distances is that they are invaria…
A Dynamic Approach to Collaborative Document Writing (Full Version)
Avital Finanser, Nimrod Talmon
We introduce a model for collaborative text aggregation in which an agent community coauthors a document, modeled as an unordered collection of paragraphs, using a dynamic mechanis…
A Social Choice Analysis of Optimism's Retroactive Project Funding
Eyal Briman, Nimrod Talmon, Angela Kreitenweis +1
The Optimism Retroactive Project Funding (RetroPGF) is a key initiative within the blockchain ecosystem that retroactively rewards projects deemed valuable to the Ethereum and Opti…
Federated Assemblies
Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Ehud Shapiro +1
A citizens' assembly is a group of people who are randomly selected to represent a larger population in a deliberation. While this approach has successfully strengthened democracy,…
Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy
Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Tanmay Inamdar, Pallavi Jain +2
In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess…
Participatory Budgeting: Data, Tools, and Analysis
Piotr Faliszewski, Jarosław Flis, Dominik Peters +5
We provide a library of participatory budgeting data (Pabulib) and open source tools (Pabutools and Pabustats) for analysing this data. We analyse how the results of participatory…
Fine-Grained Liquid Democracy for Cumulative Ballots
Matthias Köppe, Martin Koutecký, Krzysztof Sornat +1
We investigate efficient ways for the incorporation of liquid democracy into election settings in which voters submit cumulative ballots, i.e., when each voter is assigned a virtua…
Better Collective Decisions via Uncertainty Reduction
Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Laurent Bulteau, Edith Elkind +2
We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is bette…
How to Sample Approval Elections?
Stanisław Szufa, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko +4
We study the multifaceted question of how to sample approval elections in a meaningful way. Our analysis aims to discern the properties of various statistical cultures (both establ…
Iterative Deliberation via Metric Aggregation
Gil Ben Zvi, Eyal Leizerovich, Nimrod Talmon
We investigate an iterative deliberation process for an agent community wishing to make a joint decision. We develop a general model consisting of a community of n agents, each wit…
Bribery as a Measure of Candidate Success: Complexity Results for Approval-Based Multiwinner Rules
Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Nimrod Talmon
We study the problem of bribery in multiwinner elections, for the case where the voters cast approval ballots (i.e., sets of candidates they approve) and the bribery actions are li…
Proportionality in Committee Selection with Negative Feelings
Nimrod Talmon, Rutvik Page
We study a class of elections in which the input format is trichotomous and allows voters to elicit their negative feelings explicitly. In particular, we study multiwinner election…
Participatory Budgeting with Project Groups
Pallavi Jain, Krzysztof Sornat, Nimrod Talmon +1
We study a generalization of the standard approval-based model of participatory budgeting (PB), in which voters are providing approval ballots over a set of predefined projects and…
What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain
Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Jean-Francois Laslier +3
We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules--SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin--Courant, and HarmonicBorda--for elections generated according to t…
Distributed Monitoring of Election Winners
Arnold Filtser, Nimrod Talmon
We consider distributed elections, where there is a center and sites. In such distributed elections, each voter has preferences over some set of candidates, and each voter is a…
Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy
Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko +1
Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natur…
Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms
Haris Aziz, Barton Lee, Nimrod Talmon
Participatory budgeting is one of the exciting developments in deliberative grassroots democracy. We concentrate on approval elections and propose proportional representation axiom…
The Complexity of Multiwinner Voting Rules with Variable Number of Winners
Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon
We consider the approval-based model of elections, and undertake a computational study of voting rules which select committees whose size is not predetermined. While voting rules t…
A Participatory Democratic Budgeting Algorithm
Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon
The budget is the key means for effecting policy in democracies, yet its preparation is typically an excluding, opaque, and arcane process. We aim to rectify this by providing for…
Robustness Among Multiwinner Voting Rules
Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk +3
We investigate how robust the results of committee elections are to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules…
Proportional Representation in Vote Streams
Palash Dey, Nimrod Talmon, Otniel van Handel
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respec…
Teams in Online Scheduling Polls: Game-Theoretic Aspects
Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier +2
Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon…