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20162026
most citedTruthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness

28 citations · 29 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for

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11 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2026

Envy Cycle Elimination with Strategic Agents: Best Responses and Fairness Guarantees

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser

With strong evidence in the literature showing that fairness and truthfulness are incompatible, there is a recent line of work focusing on the fairness properties of equilibria of…

cs.GT2026

Position Auctions with a Capacity Constraint

Eleni Batziou, Georgios Birmpas, Georgios Chionas +1

Sponsored search auctions are commonly modeled as an assignment of a fixed set of slots (positions) to a set of advertisers, with welfare maximization being reducible to a standard…

cs.GT2024

Reward Schemes and Committee Sizes in Proof of Stake Governance

Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos, Evangelos Markakis +1

In this paper, we investigate the impact of reward schemes and committee sizes motivated by governance systems over blockchain communities. We introduce a model for elections with…

cs.GT2022

Decentralised Update Selection with Semi-Strategic Experts

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos +1

Motivated by governance models adopted in blockchain applications, we study the problem of selecting appropriate system updates in a decentralised way. Contrary to most existing vo…

cs.GT2022

Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: A Survey

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +1

Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since the ancient times, with most of the early rigorous mathematical work on the problem focusing…

cs.GT2020

A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +1

We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions. The goal is…