2 citations · 3 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +1
We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions. The goal is…
Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains: Complement-Free Cost Functions and Beyond
Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer
We study mechanism design for combinatorial cost sharing. Imagine that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested agents. The outcome of a mech…
Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis
We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a…