8 citations · 10 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Sampling from the Gibbs Distribution in Congestion Games
Pieter Kleer
Logit dynamics is a form of randomized game dynamics where players have a bias towards strategic deviations that give a higher improvement in cost. It is used extensively in practi…
Topological Price of Anarchy Bounds for Clustering Games on Networks
Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
We consider clustering games in which the players are embedded in a network and want to coordinate (or anti-coordinate) their strategy with their neighbors. The goal of a player is…
Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online
Georgios Amanatidis, Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constra…
Path deviations outperform approximate stability in heterogeneous congestion games
Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
We consider non-atomic network congestion games with heterogeneous players where the latencies of the paths are subject to some bounded deviations. This model encompasses several w…
Tight Inefficiency Bounds for Perception-Parameterized Affine Congestion Games
Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
Congestion games constitute an important class of non-cooperative games which was introduced by Rosenthal in 1973. In recent years, several extensions of these games were proposed…
The Impact of Worst-Case Deviations in Non-Atomic Network Routing Games
Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
We introduce a unifying model to study the impact of worst-case latency deviations in non-atomic selfish routing games. In our model, latencies are subject to (bounded) deviations…