activity
20132023
most citedThe Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence

5 citations · 12 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

11 papers

cs.GT2023★ 3 cited

Partitioned Matching Games for International Kidney Exchange

Márton Benedek, Péter Biró, Walter Kern +2

We introduce partitioned matching games as a suitable model for international kidney exchange programmes, where in each round the total number of available kidney transplants needs…

cs.CY2021★ 1 cited

Improving Data Use and Participatory Action and Design to Support Data Use: The Case of DHIS2 in Rwanda

Scott Russpatrick, Magnus Li, Jørn Braa +9

This article reports from an ongoing 'evaluation for improvement' action research and participatory design project in Rwanda, where the aim is to improve data use practices and the…

cs.GT2021

Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching

Haris Aziz, Anton Baychkov, Peter Biro

We introduce a new two-sided stable matching problem that describes the summer internship matching practice of an Australian university. The model is a case between two models of K…

econ.TH2020★ 5 cited

The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence

Péter Biró, Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm +2

We study stable allocations in college admissions markets where students can attend the same college under different financial terms. The deferred acceptance algorithm identifies a…

math.OC2019★ 1 cited

IP Solutions for International Kidney Exchange Programmes

Péter Biró, Márton Gyetvai, Radu Stefan Mincu +2

In kidney exchange programmes patients with end-stage renal failure may exchange their willing, but incompatible living donors among each other. National kidney exchange programmes…

cs.GT2017

Stable project allocation under distributional constraints

Kolos Csaba Ágoston, Péter Biró, Richárd Szántó

In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some…

cs.GT2016

Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences

Haris Aziz, Péter Biró, Serge Gaspers +3

We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three mod…

cs.GT2016

Efficient Reallocation under Additive and Responsive Preferences

Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Jerome Lang +2

Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is general…

cs.GT2015★ 1 cited

The Stable Fixtures Problem with Payments

Péter Biró, Walter Kern, Daniël Paulusma +1

We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph , with an integer vertex capacity function and a…

cs.GT2014

Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems

Peter Biro, Iain McBride

We develop Integer Programming (IP) solutions for some special college admission problems arising from the Hungarian higher education admission scheme. We focus on four special fea…

cs.DS2013★ 1 cited

The Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples: Complexity and Integer Programming Models

P. Biro, D. F. Manlove, I. McBride

The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals / Resident problem (HR) that is important in practical applications because it m…