31 citations · 136 across the 29 of their papers we have counts for
27 papers · 1 filter
Strategic Proxy Voting on the Line
Gili Bielous, Reshef Meir
This paper offers a framework for the study of strategic behavior in proxy voting, where non-active voters delegate their votes to active voters. We further study how proxy voting…
Strategy-proof Budgeting via a VCG-like Mechanism
Jonathan Wagner, Reshef Meir
We present a strategy-proof public goods budgeting mechanism where agents determine both the total volume of expanses and the specific allocation. It is constructed as a modificati…
Convergence of Multi-Issue Iterative Voting under Uncertainty
Joshua Kavner, Reshef Meir, Francesca Rossi +1
We study the effect of strategic behavior in iterative voting for multiple issues under uncertainty. We introduce a model synthesizing simultaneous multi-issue voting with Meir, Le…
Welfare vs. Representation in Participatory Budgeting
Roy Fairstein, Reshef Meir, Dan Vilenchik +1
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process for allocating funds to projects based on the votes of members of the community. Different rules have been used to aggregate pa…
Strategyproof Facility Location Mechanisms on Discrete Trees
Alina Filimonov, Reshef Meir
We address the problem of strategyproof (SP) facility location mechanisms on discrete trees. Our main result is a full characterization of onto and SP mechanisms. In particular, we…
Representative Committees of Peers
Reshef Meir, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Moshe Tennenholtz
A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the…
Cumulative Games: Who is the current player?
Urban Larsson, Reshef Meir, Yair Zick
Combinatorial Game Theory(CGT)is a branch of Game Theory that has developed largely independently of Economic Game Theory (EGT), and is concerned with deep mathematical properties…
Distance-based Equilibria in Normal-Form Games
Erman Acar, Reshef Meir
We propose a simple uncertainty modification for the agent model in normal-form games; at any given strategy profile, the agent can access only a set of "possible profiles" that ar…
Modeling Peoples Voting Behavior with Poll Information
Roy Fairstein, Adam Lauz, Kobi Gal +1
Despite the prevalence of voting systems in the real world there is no consensus among researchers of how people vote strategically, even in simple voting settings. This paper addr…
Penalty Bidding Mechanisms for Allocating Resources and Overcoming Present Bias
Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes +1
From skipped exercise classes to last-minute cancellation of dentist appointments, underutilization of reserved resources abounds. Likely reasons include uncertainty about the futu…
Strategyproof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle
Reshef Meir
We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability propo…
Heuristic Voting as Ordinal Dominance Strategies
Omer Lev, Reshef Meir, Svetlana Obraztsova +1
Decision making under uncertainty is a key component of many AI settings, and in particular of voting scenarios where strategic agents are trying to reach a joint decision. The com…
Efficient Crowdsourcing via Proxy Voting
Gal Cohensius, Omer Ben Porat, Reshef Meir +1
Crowdsourcing platforms offer a way to label data by aggregating answers of multiple unqualified workers. We introduce a \textit{simple} and \textit{budget efficient} crowdsourcing…
Predicting Strategic Voting Behavior with Poll Information
Roy Fairstein, Adam Lauz, Kobi Gal +1
The question of how people vote strategically under uncertainty has attracted much attention in several disciplines. Theoretical decision models have been proposed which vary in th…
Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities
Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
Without monetary payments, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that under mild requirements all truthful social choice mechanisms must be dictatorships. When payments are allo…
Contract Design for Energy Demand Response
Reshef Meir, Hongyao Ma, Valentin Robu
Power companies such as Southern California Edison (SCE) uses Demand Response (DR) contracts to incentivize consumers to reduce their power consumption during periods when demand f…
Proxy Voting for Better Outcomes
Gal Cohensius, Shie Manor, Reshef Meir +2
We consider a social choice problem where only a small number of people out of a large population are sufficiently available or motivated to vote. A common solution to increase par…
Random Tie-breaking with Stochastic Dominance
Reshef Meir
Consider Plurality with random tie-breaking. This paper uses standard axiomatic extensions of preferences over elements to preferences over sets (Kelly, Gardenfors, Responsiveness)…
Contingent Payment Mechanisms for Resource Utilization
Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes +1
We introduce the problem of assigning resources to improve their utilization. The motivation comes from settings where agents have uncertainty about their own values for using a re…
Congestion Games with Distance-Based Strict Uncertainty
Reshef Meir, David Parkes
We put forward a new model of congestion games where agents have uncertainty over the routes used by other agents. We take a non-probabilistic approach, assuming that each agent kn…
Playing the Wrong Game: Bounding Externalities in Diverse Populations of Agents
Reshef Meir, David Parkes
The robustness of multiagent systems can be affected by mistakes or behavioral biases (e.g., risk-aversion, altruism, toll-sensitivity), with some agents playing the "wrong game."…
A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria
Reshef Meir, Omer Lev, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studie…
Bidding Games and Efficient Allocations
Gil Kalai, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz
Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next [Lazarus et al.'99]. We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two pla…
Equilibrium in Labor Markets with Few Firms
Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz
We study competition between firms in labor markets, following a combinatorial model suggested by Kelso and Crawford [1982]. In this model, each firm is trying to recruit workers b…