31 citations · 136 across the 29 of their papers we have counts for
38 papers
Strategic Proxy Voting on the Line
Gili Bielous, Reshef Meir
This paper offers a framework for the study of strategic behavior in proxy voting, where non-active voters delegate their votes to active voters. We further study how proxy voting…
Strategy-proof Budgeting via a VCG-like Mechanism
Jonathan Wagner, Reshef Meir
We present a strategy-proof public goods budgeting mechanism where agents determine both the total volume of expanses and the specific allocation. It is constructed as a modificati…
Mitigating Skewed Bidding for Conference Paper Assignment
Inbal Rozencweig, Reshef Meir, Nick Mattei +1
The explosion of conference paper submissions in AI and related fields, has underscored the need to improve many aspects of the peer review process, especially the matching of pape…
Convergence of Multi-Issue Iterative Voting under Uncertainty
Joshua Kavner, Reshef Meir, Francesca Rossi +1
We study the effect of strategic behavior in iterative voting for multiple issues under uncertainty. We introduce a model synthesizing simultaneous multi-issue voting with Meir, Le…
Empirical Bayes approach to Truth Discovery problems
Tsviel Ben Shabat, Reshef Meir, David Azriel
When aggregating information from conflicting sources, one's goal is to find the truth. Most real-value \emph{truth discovery} (TD) algorithms try to achieve this goal by estimatin…
Welfare vs. Representation in Participatory Budgeting
Roy Fairstein, Reshef Meir, Dan Vilenchik +1
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process for allocating funds to projects based on the votes of members of the community. Different rules have been used to aggregate pa…
The Core of Approval Participatory Budgeting with Uniform Costs (or with up to Four Projects) is Non-Empty
Reshef Meir
In the Approval Participatory Budgeting problem an agent prefers a set of projects over if she approves strictly more projects in . A set of projects is in the cor…
Strategyproof Facility Location Mechanisms on Discrete Trees
Alina Filimonov, Reshef Meir
We address the problem of strategyproof (SP) facility location mechanisms on discrete trees. Our main result is a full characterization of onto and SP mechanisms. In particular, we…
Representative Committees of Peers
Reshef Meir, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Moshe Tennenholtz
A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the…
Cumulative Games: Who is the current player?
Urban Larsson, Reshef Meir, Yair Zick
Combinatorial Game Theory(CGT)is a branch of Game Theory that has developed largely independently of Economic Game Theory (EGT), and is concerned with deep mathematical properties…
Distance-based Equilibria in Normal-Form Games
Erman Acar, Reshef Meir
We propose a simple uncertainty modification for the agent model in normal-form games; at any given strategy profile, the agent can access only a set of "possible profiles" that ar…
Safe Voting: Resilience to Abstention and Sybils
Reshef Meir, Gal Shahaf, Ehud Shapiro +1
Voting rules may implement the will of the society when all eligible voters vote, and only them. However, they may fail to do so when sybil (fake or duplicate) votes are present an…
Bidding in Spades
Gal Cohensius, Reshef Meir, Nadav Oved +1
We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independe…
Modeling Peoples Voting Behavior with Poll Information
Roy Fairstein, Adam Lauz, Kobi Gal +1
Despite the prevalence of voting systems in the real world there is no consensus among researchers of how people vote strategically, even in simple voting settings. This paper addr…
Penalty Bidding Mechanisms for Allocating Resources and Overcoming Present Bias
Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes +1
From skipped exercise classes to last-minute cancellation of dentist appointments, underutilization of reserved resources abounds. Likely reasons include uncertainty about the futu…
Frustratingly Easy Truth Discovery
Reshef Meir, Ofra Amir, Omer Ben-Porat +3
Truth discovery is a general name for a broad range of statistical methods aimed to extract the correct answers to questions, based on multiple answers coming from noisy sources. F…
Strategyproof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle
Reshef Meir
We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability propo…
Heuristic Voting as Ordinal Dominance Strategies
Omer Lev, Reshef Meir, Svetlana Obraztsova +1
Decision making under uncertainty is a key component of many AI settings, and in particular of voting scenarios where strategic agents are trying to reach a joint decision. The com…
Efficient Crowdsourcing via Proxy Voting
Gal Cohensius, Omer Ben Porat, Reshef Meir +1
Crowdsourcing platforms offer a way to label data by aggregating answers of multiple unqualified workers. We introduce a \textit{simple} and \textit{budget efficient} crowdsourcing…
Predicting Strategic Voting Behavior with Poll Information
Roy Fairstein, Adam Lauz, Kobi Gal +1
The question of how people vote strategically under uncertainty has attracted much attention in several disciplines. Theoretical decision models have been proposed which vary in th…
Cumulative subtraction games
Gal Cohensius, Urban Larsson, Reshef Meir +1
We study zero-sum games, a variant of the classical combinatorial Subtraction games (studied for example in the monumental work "Winning Ways", by Berlekamp, Conway and Guy), calle…
Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities
Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
Without monetary payments, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that under mild requirements all truthful social choice mechanisms must be dictatorships. When payments are allo…
Directed Graph Minors and Serial-Parallel Width
Argyrios Deligkas, Reshef Meir
Graph minors are a primary tool in understanding the structure of undirected graphs, with many conceptual and algorithmic implications. We propose new variants of \emph{directed gr…
Contract Design for Energy Demand Response
Reshef Meir, Hongyao Ma, Valentin Robu
Power companies such as Southern California Edison (SCE) uses Demand Response (DR) contracts to incentivize consumers to reduce their power consumption during periods when demand f…