◍wovepaper
SearchResearchersInstitutions
Sign in
researcher

Jie Zhang

4 papers hereh-index 7315 citations8 works total

Matching runs newest-first, so older work may not be attached to this profile yet.

author position
  • middle author2
  • last author2

Across the 4 of 4 papers where every author was matched, so the position is known.

fields
  • cs.GT4
same name
  • Jie Zhang — 41 papers, h 20
  • Jie Zhang — 29 papers, h 30
  • Jie Zhang — 28 papers, h 19
  • Jie Zhang — 25 papers, h 8
  • Jie Zhang — 17 papers, h 10
  • Jie Zhang — 16 papers, h 14

Either other researchers who publish under this name, or the same person where the external sources have not merged their records.

identity via Semantic Scholar / OpenAlex

activity
20142016
most citedSocial welfare in one-sided matchings: Random priority and beyond

8 citations · 15 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

4 papers

cs.GT2016

Hardness Results for Consensus-Halving

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Soren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Paul W. Goldberg +1

We study the consensus-halving problem of dividing an object into two portions, such that each of n agents has equal valuation for the two portions. The ε-approximate consensus…

cs.GT2015★ 6 cited

Facility location with double-peaked preference

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Minming Li, Jie Zhang +1

We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being o…

cs.GT2015★ 1 cited

Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Mechanisms

George Christodoulou, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Soren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen +3

We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both or…

cs.GT2014★ 8 cited

Social welfare in one-sided matchings: Random priority and beyond

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Jie Zhang

We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matching problems when agents have unrestricted cardinal preferences over a finite set…

◍wovepaper

Papers, researchers and institutions, woven together.

Explore
  • Search
  • Researchers
  • Institutions
Account
  • Library
  • Chat
Data
  • arXiv.org
  • Semantic Scholar
  • OpenAlex
  • Latest RSS
AboutContactPrivacyDevelopersllms.txtopenapi.json
Not affiliated with arXiv. Researcher data from Semantic Scholar (ODC-BY) and OpenAlex.