activity
20242026
most citedEvaluations of Machine Learning Privacy Defenses are Misleading

15 citations · 27 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

17 papers

cs.LG2026

Learning to Inject: Automated Prompt Injection via Reinforcement Learning

Xin Chen, Jie Zhang, Florian Tramèr

Prompt injection is a critical vulnerability in LLM agents, yet the strongest methods still rely on human red-teamers and hand-crafted prompts. Adapting automated jailbreak optimiz…

cs.CR2025

Patronus: Safeguarding Text-to-Image Models against White-Box Adversaries

Xinfeng Li, Shengyuan Pang, Jialin Wu +5

Text-to-image (T2I) models, though exhibiting remarkable creativity in image generation, can be exploited to produce unsafe images. Existing safety measures, e.g., content moderati…

cs.LG2025

Token Buncher: Shielding LLMs from Harmful Reinforcement Learning Fine-Tuning

Weitao Feng, Lixu Wang, Peizhuo Lv +5

As large language models (LLMs) continue to grow in capability, so do the risks of harmful misuse through fine-tuning. While most prior studies assume that attackers rely on superv…

cs.CR2025

Membership Inference Attacks on Sequence Models

Lorenzo Rossi, Michael Aerni, Jie Zhang +1

Sequence models, such as Large Language Models (LLMs) and autoregressive image generators, have a tendency to memorize and inadvertently leak sensitive information. While this tend…

cs.LG2025

A Unified Gradient-based Framework for Task-agnostic Continual Learning-Unlearning

Zhehao Huang, Xinwen Cheng, Jie Zhang +5

Recent advancements in deep models have highlighted the need for intelligent systems that combine continual learning (CL) for knowledge acquisition with machine unlearning (MU) for…

cs.CV2025

MoAPT: Mixture of Adversarial Prompt Tuning for Vision-Language Models

Shiji Zhao, Qihui Zhu, Shukun Xiong +7

Large pre-trained Vision Language Models (VLMs) demonstrate excellent generalization capabilities but remain highly susceptible to adversarial examples, posing potential security r…

cs.AI2025

RealMath: A Continuous Benchmark for Evaluating Language Models on Research-Level Mathematics

Jie Zhang, Cezara Petrui, Kristina Nikolić +1

Existing benchmarks for evaluating mathematical reasoning in large language models (LLMs) rely primarily on competition problems, formal proofs, or artificially challenging questio…

cs.LG2025

The Jailbreak Tax: How Useful are Your Jailbreak Outputs?

Kristina Nikolić, Luze Sun, Jie Zhang +1

Jailbreak attacks bypass the guardrails of large language models to produce harmful outputs. In this paper, we ask whether the model outputs produced by existing jailbreaks are act…

cs.CR2025

Does Training with Synthetic Data Truly Protect Privacy?

Yunpeng Zhao, Jie Zhang

As synthetic data becomes increasingly popular in machine learning tasks, numerous methods--without formal differential privacy guarantees--use synthetic data for training. These m…

cs.LG2025★ 1 cited

Position: Adversarial ML for LLMs Is Not Making Any Progress

Javier Rando, Jie Zhang, Nicholas Carlini +1

In the past decade, considerable research effort has been devoted to securing machine learning (ML) models that operate in adversarial settings. Yet, progress has been slow even fo…

cs.LG2024

Evaluating the Robustness of the "Ensemble Everything Everywhere" Defense

Jie Zhang, Christian Schlarmann, Kristina Nikolić +4

Ensemble everything everywhere is a defense to adversarial examples that was recently proposed to make image classifiers robust. This defense works by ensembling a model's intermed…

cs.LG2024★ 1 cited

Membership Inference Attacks Cannot Prove that a Model Was Trained On Your Data

Jie Zhang, Debeshee Das, Gautam Kamath +1

We consider the problem of a training data proof, where a data creator or owner wants to demonstrate to a third party that some machine learning model was trained on their data. Tr…

cs.CR2024

Blind Baselines Beat Membership Inference Attacks for Foundation Models

Debeshee Das, Jie Zhang, Florian Tramèr

Membership inference (MI) attacks try to determine if a data sample was used to train a machine learning model. For foundation models trained on unknown Web data, MI attacks are of…

cs.CR2024★ 7 cited

AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents

Edoardo Debenedetti, Jie Zhang, Mislav Balunović +3

AI agents aim to solve complex tasks by combining text-based reasoning with external tool calls. Unfortunately, AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks where data retu…

cs.LG2024

Unlearning during Learning: An Efficient Federated Machine Unlearning Method

Hanlin Gu, Gongxi Zhu, Jie Zhang +4

In recent years, Federated Learning (FL) has garnered significant attention as a distributed machine learning paradigm. To facilitate the implementation of the right to be forgotte…

cs.CR2024★ 15 cited

Evaluations of Machine Learning Privacy Defenses are Misleading

Michael Aerni, Jie Zhang, Florian Tramèr

Empirical defenses for machine learning privacy forgo the provable guarantees of differential privacy in the hope of achieving higher utility while resisting realistic adversaries.…

cs.CR2024★ 3 cited

Jailbreaking Prompt Attack: A Controllable Adversarial Attack against Diffusion Models

Jiachen Ma, Yijiang Li, Zhiqing Xiao +4

Text-to-image (T2I) models can be maliciously used to generate harmful content such as sexually explicit, unfaithful, and misleading or Not-Safe-for-Work (NSFW) images. Previous at…