6 citations · 28 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
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3 papers · 1 filter
cs.GT2015★ 5 cited
Strategyproof Quota Mechanisms for Multiple Assignment Problems
Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson
We study the problem of allocating multiple objects to agents without transferable utilities, where each agent may receive more than one object according to a quota. Under lexicogr…
cs.GT2015★ 3 cited
Random Serial Dictatorship versus Probabilistic Serial Rule: A Tale of Two Random Mechanisms
Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson, Robin Cohen
For assignment problems where agents, specifying ordinal preferences, are allocated indivisible objects, two widely studied randomized mechanisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship…
cs.GT2015★ 6 cited
Characterization and Computation of Equilibria for Indivisible Goods
Simina Brânzei, Hadi Hosseini, Peter Bro Miltersen
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incom…