5 citations · 15 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
Fairly Dividing Mixtures of Goods and Chores under Lexicographic Preferences
Hadi Hosseini, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish +1
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores among agents with \emph{lexicographic} preferences -- a subclass of additive valuations. In sharp contrast to the goods-onl…
Class Fairness in Online Matching
Hadi Hosseini, Zhiyi Huang, Ayumi Igarashi +1
In the classical version of online bipartite matching, there is a given set of offline vertices (aka agents) and another set of vertices (aka items) that arrive online. When each i…
Fair Stable Matching Meets Correlated Preferences
Angelina Brilliantova, Hadi Hosseini
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It…
Two for One One for All: Two-Sided Manipulation in Matching Markets
Hadi Hosseini, Fatima Umar, Rohit Vaish
Strategic behavior in two-sided matching markets has been traditionally studied in a "one-sided" manipulation setting where the agent who misreports is also the intended beneficiar…
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores
Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of m indivisible chores (items with non-positive value) to n agents. We consider the desirable fairness notion of 1-out-of-d maximin…
Surprisingly Popular Voting Recovers Rankings, Surprisingly!
Hadi Hosseini, Debmalya Mandal, Nisarg Shah +1
The wisdom of the crowd has long become the de facto approach for eliciting information from individuals or experts in order to predict the ground truth. However, classical democra…