10 citations · 29 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for
21 papers
Simultaneous Envy and Equitability Guarantees
Hadi Hosseini, Shraddha Pathak, Lirong Xia +1
Recent work in fair division has focused on either simultaneously satisfying closely related fairness notions or achieving a single notion across the ex-ante and ex-post worlds. We…
To EFX OR to MMS, That is the Question
Hadi Hosseini, Payas Khurana, Shraddha Pathak +1
We study the agent-wise disjunction of two central fairness notions for indivisible items, where every agent must be either envy-free up to any item (EFX) or maximin-share (MMS) sa…
Tight Approximations for Graphical House Allocation
Hadi Hosseini, Andrew McGregor, Rik Sengupta +2
The Graphical House Allocation problem asks: how can houses (each with a fixed non-negative value) be assigned to the vertices of an undirected graph , so as to minimize the…
Fairly Allocating Goods and (Terrible) Chores
Hadi Hosseini, Aghaheybat Mammadov, Tomasz Wąs
We study the fair allocation of mixtures of indivisible goods and chores under lexicographic preferences$\unicode{x2014}$a subdomain of additive preferences. A prominent fairness n…
Distribution of Chores with Information Asymmetry
Hadi Hosseini, Joshua Kavner, Tomasz Wąs +1
A well-regarded fairness notion when dividing indivisible chores is envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), which requires that pairwise envy can be eliminated by the removal of a sing…
Fair Distribution of Delivery Orders
Hadi Hosseini, Shivika Narang, Tomasz Wąs
We initiate the study of fair distribution of delivery tasks among a set of agents wherein delivery jobs are placed along the vertices of a graph. Our goal is to fairly distribute…
Graphical House Allocation
Hadi Hosseini, Justin Payan, Rik Sengupta +2
The classical house allocation problem involves assigning houses (or items) to agents according to their preferences. A key criterion in such problems is satisfying some fa…
Epistemic vs. Counterfactual Fairness in Allocation of Resources
Hadi Hosseini, Joshua Kavner, Sujoy Sikdar +2
Resource allocation is fundamental to a variety of societal decision-making settings, ranging from the distribution of charitable donations to assigning limited public housing amon…
Fairly Dividing Mixtures of Goods and Chores under Lexicographic Preferences
Hadi Hosseini, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish +1
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores among agents with \emph{lexicographic} preferences -- a subclass of additive valuations. In sharp contrast to the goods-onl…
Class Fairness in Online Matching
Hadi Hosseini, Zhiyi Huang, Ayumi Igarashi +1
In the classical version of online bipartite matching, there is a given set of offline vertices (aka agents) and another set of vertices (aka items) that arrive online. When each i…
Fair Stable Matching Meets Correlated Preferences
Angelina Brilliantova, Hadi Hosseini
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It…
Two for One One for All: Two-Sided Manipulation in Matching Markets
Hadi Hosseini, Fatima Umar, Rohit Vaish
Strategic behavior in two-sided matching markets has been traditionally studied in a "one-sided" manipulation setting where the agent who misreports is also the intended beneficiar…
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores
Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of m indivisible chores (items with non-positive value) to n agents. We consider the desirable fairness notion of 1-out-of-d maximin…
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods
Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
In fair division of indivisible goods, -out-of- maximin share (MMS) is the value that an agent can guarantee by partitioning the goods into bundles and choosing the $\…
Surprisingly Popular Voting Recovers Rankings, Surprisingly!
Hadi Hosseini, Debmalya Mandal, Nisarg Shah +1
The wisdom of the crowd has long become the de facto approach for eliciting information from individuals or experts in order to predict the ground truth. However, classical democra…
Guaranteeing Maximin Shares: Some Agents Left Behind
Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns
The maximin share (MMS) guarantee is a desirable fairness notion for allocating indivisible goods. While MMS allocations do not always exist, several approximation techniques have…
Fair and Efficient Allocations under Lexicographic Preferences
Hadi Hosseini, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish +1
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) provides a strong and intuitive guarantee of fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods. But whether such allocations always exist or whethe…
Accomplice Manipulation of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Hadi Hosseini, Fatima Umar, Rohit Vaish
The deferred acceptance algorithm is an elegant solution to the stable matching problem that guarantees optimality and truthfulness for one side of the market. Despite these desira…
Necessarily Optimal One-Sided Matchings
Hadi Hosseini, Vijay Menon, Nisarg Shah +1
We study the classical problem of matching agents to objects, where the agents have ranked preferences over the objects. We focus on two popular desiderata from the matchin…
Fair Division of Time: Multi-layered Cake Cutting
Hadi Hosseini, Ayumi Igarashi, Andrew Searns
We initiate the study of multi-layered cake cutting with the goal of fairly allocating multiple divisible resources (layers of a cake) among a set of agents. The key requirement is…
The Crawler: Three Equivalence Results for Object (Re)allocation Problems when Preferences Are Single-peaked
Yuki Tamura, Hadi Hosseini
For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying effici…