6 citations · 28 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Fair Division through Information Withholding
Hadi Hosseini, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish +2
Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods that addresses pairwise envy by the removal of at most one good. In the worst case, each…
Investigating the Characteristics of One-Sided Matching Mechanisms Under Various Preferences and Risk Attitudes
Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson, Robin Cohen
One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-stud…
Strategyproof Quota Mechanisms for Multiple Assignment Problems
Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson
We study the problem of allocating multiple objects to agents without transferable utilities, where each agent may receive more than one object according to a quota. Under lexicogr…
Random Serial Dictatorship versus Probabilistic Serial Rule: A Tale of Two Random Mechanisms
Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson, Robin Cohen
For assignment problems where agents, specifying ordinal preferences, are allocated indivisible objects, two widely studied randomized mechanisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship…
Characterization and Computation of Equilibria for Indivisible Goods
Simina Brânzei, Hadi Hosseini, Peter Bro Miltersen
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incom…