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cs.GT2019★ 1 cited
Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains: Complement-Free Cost Functions and Beyond
Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer
We study mechanism design for combinatorial cost sharing. Imagine that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested agents. The outcome of a mech…
cs.GT2019
Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online
Georgios Amanatidis, Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constra…