3 citations · 4 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains: Complement-Free Cost Functions and Beyond
Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer
We study mechanism design for combinatorial cost sharing. Imagine that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested agents. The outcome of a mech…
Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online
Georgios Amanatidis, Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constra…
The Curse of Ties in Congestion Games with Limited Lookahead
Carla Groenland, Guido Schäfer
We introduce a novel framework to model limited lookahead in congestion games. Intuitively, the players enter the game sequentially and choose an optimal action under the assumptio…
Path deviations outperform approximate stability in heterogeneous congestion games
Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
We consider non-atomic network congestion games with heterogeneous players where the latencies of the paths are subject to some bounded deviations. This model encompasses several w…
The Impact of Worst-Case Deviations in Non-Atomic Network Routing Games
Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
We introduce a unifying model to study the impact of worst-case latency deviations in non-atomic selfish routing games. In our model, latencies are subject to (bounded) deviations…
Efficient Equilibria in Polymatrix Coordination Games
Mona Rahn, Guido Schäfer
We consider polymatrix coordination games with individual preferences where every player corresponds to a node in a graph who plays with each neighbor a separate bimatrix game with…