15 citations · 80 across the 26 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers · 1 filter
Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading…
Optimal Pricing of Information
Shuze Liu, Weiran Shen, Haifeng Xu
A decision maker is choosing between an active action (e.g., purchase a house, invest certain stock) and a passive action. The payoff of the active action depends on the buyer's pr…
Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance
You Zu, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Haifeng Xu
Motivated by information sharing in online platforms, we study repeated persuasion between a sender and a stream of receivers where at each time, the sender observes a payoff-relev…
The Power of Signaling and its Intrinsic Connection to the Price of Anarchy
James Nachbar, Haifeng Xu
A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behavior often renders the equilibrium outcome inefficient. The recent literature of information design -- a.k.a. signaling or per…
Computing Equilibria of Prediction Markets via Persuasion
Jerry Anunrojwong, Yiling Chen, Bo Waggoner +1
We study the computation of equilibria in prediction markets in perhaps the most fundamental special case with two players and three trading opportunities. To do so, we show equiva…
Selling Information Through Consulting
Yiling Chen, Haifeng Xu, Shuran Zheng
We consider a monopoly information holder selling information to a budget-constrained decision maker, who may benefit from the seller's information. The decision maker has a utilit…
On the Tractability of Public Persuasion with No Externalities
Haifeng Xu
Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents' decisions via strategic information revelation --- often described as a signaling scheme --- in order to yield the most des…
Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games
Jiarui Gan, Haifeng Xu, Qingyu Guo +3
Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with t…
Targeting and Signaling in Ad Auctions
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Haifeng Xu
Modern ad auctions allow advertisers to target more specific segments of the user population. Unfortunately, this is not always in the best interest of the ad platform. In this pap…
Mitigating the Curse of Correlation in Security Games by Entropy Maximization
Haifeng Xu, Milind Tambe, Shaddin Dughmi +1
In Stackelberg security games, a defender seeks to randomly allocate limited security resources to protect critical targets from an attack. In this paper, we study a fundamental, y…
Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities
Shaddin Dughmi, Haifeng Xu
We study the algorithmics of information structure design -- a.k.a. persuasion or signaling -- in a fundamental special case introduced by Arieli and Babichenko: multiple agents, b…
The Mysteries of Security Games: Equilibrium Computation Becomes Combinatorial Algorithm Design
Haifeng Xu
The security game is a basic model for resource allocation in adversarial environments. Here there are two players, a defender and an attacker. The defender wants to allocate her l…
Security Games with Information Leakage: Modeling and Computation
Haifeng Xu, Albert X. Jiang, Arunesh Sinha +3
Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strat…
Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
Shaddin Dughmi, Haifeng Xu
Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimat…