15 citations · 80 across the 26 of their papers we have counts for
27 papers
Incentivized Communication for Federated Bandits
Zhepei Wei, Chuanhao Li, Haifeng Xu +1
Most existing works on federated bandits take it for granted that all clients are altruistic about sharing their data with the server for the collective good whenever needed. Despi…
Follow-ups Also Matter: Improving Contextual Bandits via Post-serving Contexts
Chaoqi Wang, Ziyu Ye, Zhe Feng +2
Standard contextual bandit problem assumes that all the relevant contexts are observed before the algorithm chooses an arm. This modeling paradigm, while useful, often falls short…
Multi-Player Bandits Robust to Adversarial Collisions
Shivakumar Mahesh, Anshuka Rangi, Haifeng Xu +1
Motivated by cognitive radios, stochastic Multi-Player Multi-Armed Bandits has been extensively studied in recent years. In this setting, each player pulls an arm, and receives a r…
Learning Correlated Stackelberg Equilibrium in General-Sum Multi-Leader-Single-Follower Games
Yaolong Yu, Haifeng Xu, Haipeng Chen
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separ…
Understanding the Limits of Poisoning Attacks in Episodic Reinforcement Learning
Anshuka Rangi, Haifeng Xu, Long Tran-Thanh +1
To understand the security threats to reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms, this paper studies poisoning attacks to manipulate \emph{any} order-optimal learning algorithm towards…
Diffusion Source Identification on Networks with Statistical Confidence
Quinlan Dawkins, Tianxi Li, Haifeng Xu
Diffusion source identification on networks is a problem of fundamental importance in a broad class of applications, including rumor controlling and virus identification. Though th…
Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading…
Incentivizing Exploration in Linear Bandits under Information Gap
Huazheng Wang, Haifeng Xu, Chuanhao Li +2
We study the problem of incentivizing exploration for myopic users in linear bandits, where the users tend to exploit arm with the highest predicted reward instead of exploring. In…
Optimal Pricing of Information
Shuze Liu, Weiran Shen, Haifeng Xu
A decision maker is choosing between an active action (e.g., purchase a house, invest certain stock) and a passive action. The payoff of the active action depends on the buyer's pr…
Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance
You Zu, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Haifeng Xu
Motivated by information sharing in online platforms, we study repeated persuasion between a sender and a stream of receivers where at each time, the sender observes a payoff-relev…
Saving Stochastic Bandits from Poisoning Attacks via Limited Data Verification
Anshuka Rangi, Long Tran-Thanh, Haifeng Xu +1
We study bandit algorithms under data poisoning attacks in a bounded reward setting. We consider a strong attacker model in which the attacker can observe both the selected actions…
PAC-Learning for Strategic Classification
Ravi Sundaram, Anil Vullikanti, Haifeng Xu +1
The study of strategic or adversarial manipulation of testing data to fool a classifier has attracted much recent attention. Most previous works have focused on two extreme situati…
The Power of Signaling and its Intrinsic Connection to the Price of Anarchy
James Nachbar, Haifeng Xu
A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behavior often renders the equilibrium outcome inefficient. The recent literature of information design -- a.k.a. signaling or per…
Computing Equilibria of Prediction Markets via Persuasion
Jerry Anunrojwong, Yiling Chen, Bo Waggoner +1
We study the computation of equilibria in prediction markets in perhaps the most fundamental special case with two players and three trading opportunities. To do so, we show equiva…
Collapsing Bandits and Their Application to Public Health Interventions
Aditya Mate, Jackson A. Killian, Haifeng Xu +2
We propose and study Collpasing Bandits, a new restless multi-armed bandit (RMAB) setting in which each arm follows a binary-state Markovian process with a special structure: when…
Selling Information Through Consulting
Yiling Chen, Haifeng Xu, Shuran Zheng
We consider a monopoly information holder selling information to a budget-constrained decision maker, who may benefit from the seller's information. The decision maker has a utilit…
On the Tractability of Public Persuasion with No Externalities
Haifeng Xu
Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents' decisions via strategic information revelation --- often described as a signaling scheme --- in order to yield the most des…
The Intrinsic Robustness of Stochastic Bandits to Strategic Manipulation
Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu
Motivated by economic applications such as recommender systems, we study the behavior of stochastic bandits algorithms under \emph{strategic behavior} conducted by rational actors,…
To Warn or Not to Warn: Online Signaling in Audit Games
Chao Yan, Haifeng Xu, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik +3
Routine operational use of sensitive data is often governed by law and regulation. For instance, in the medical domain, there are various statues at the state and federal level tha…
Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games
Jiarui Gan, Haifeng Xu, Qingyu Guo +3
Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with t…
Targeting and Signaling in Ad Auctions
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Haifeng Xu
Modern ad auctions allow advertisers to target more specific segments of the user population. Unfortunately, this is not always in the best interest of the ad platform. In this pap…
Mitigating the Curse of Correlation in Security Games by Entropy Maximization
Haifeng Xu, Milind Tambe, Shaddin Dughmi +1
In Stackelberg security games, a defender seeks to randomly allocate limited security resources to protect critical targets from an attack. In this paper, we study a fundamental, y…
Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities
Shaddin Dughmi, Haifeng Xu
We study the algorithmics of information structure design -- a.k.a. persuasion or signaling -- in a fundamental special case introduced by Arieli and Babichenko: multiple agents, b…
The Mysteries of Security Games: Equilibrium Computation Becomes Combinatorial Algorithm Design
Haifeng Xu
The security game is a basic model for resource allocation in adversarial environments. Here there are two players, a defender and an attacker. The defender wants to allocate her l…