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20152026
most citedNear-Optimal No-Regret Learning for Correlated Equilibria in Multi-Player General-Sum Games

17 citations · 130 across the 46 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2020Show all

5 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2020★ 3 cited

Faster Algorithms for Optimal Ex-Ante Coordinated Collusive Strategies in Extensive-Form Zero-Sum Games

Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti +1

We focus on the problem of finding an optimal strategy for a team of two players that faces an opponent in an imperfect-information zero-sum extensive-form game. Team members are n…

cs.GT2020★ 5 cited

Polynomial-Time Computation of Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Extensive-Form Games with Public Chance Moves and Beyond

Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm

Unlike normal-form games, where correlated equilibria have been studied for more than 45 years, extensive-form correlation is still generally not well understood. Part of the reaso…

cs.GT2020

Faster Game Solving via Predictive Blackwell Approachability: Connecting Regret Matching and Mirror Descent

Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm

Blackwell approachability is a framework for reasoning about repeated games with vector-valued payoffs. We introduce predictive Blackwell approachability, where an estimate of the…

cs.GT2020

No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium

Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi, Gabriele Farina +1

The existence of simple, uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Speci…

cs.GT2020★ 5 cited

Stochastic Regret Minimization in Extensive-Form Games

Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm

Monte-Carlo counterfactual regret minimization (MCCFR) is the state-of-the-art algorithm for solving sequential games that are too large for full tree traversals. It works by using…