74 citations · 144 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Invariant Price of Anarchy: a Metric for Welfarist Traffic Control
Ilia Shilov, Mingjia He, Heinrich H. Nax +3
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a standard metric for quantifying inefficiency in socio-technical systems, widely used to guide policies like traffic tolling. Conventional PoA analys…
Algorithmic Collusion is Algorithm Orchestration
Cesare Carissimo, Fryderyk Falniowski, Siavash Rahimi +1
We propose a fresh `meta-game' perspective on the problem of algorithmic collusion in pricing games a la Bertrand. Economists have interpreted the fact that algorithms can learn to…
'Dark pressure': A metric that yields distance-independent circular orbital speed in deep space with 'tunable' total mass
C. Mallary
In general relativity, the tangential speed of objects in stable circular orbits is not uniquely described by the orbital radius and the mass present inside the orbital radius. Thi…
Welfare and Cost Aggregation for Multi-Agent Control: When to Choose Which Social Cost Function, and Why?
Ilia Shilov, Ezzat Elokda, Sophie Hall +2
Many multi-agent socio-technical systems rely on aggregating heterogeneous agents' costs into a social cost function (SCF) to coordinate resource allocation in domains like energy…
Cycles and collusion in congestion games under Q-learning
Cesare Carissimo, Jan Nagler, Heinrich Nax
We investigate the dynamics of Q-learning in a class of generalized Braess paradox games. These games represent an important class of network routing games where the associated sta…