74 citations · 144 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers
Welfarist Control Design -- How to fulfill the societal mandate in multi-agent control?
Sophie Hall, Kai Zhang, Ilia Shilov +2
At the core of most socio-technical systems lies a scarce resource that is allocated among agents: highway lanes, public transit, road space, water rights, energy access, grid capa…
Invariant Price of Anarchy and Multiplicative Smoothness
Ilia Shilov, Heinrich H. Nax, Saverio Bolognani
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a popular measure of the costs of decentralization in terms of efficiency losses. Almost all PoA analyses operate within a framework assuming both Car…
An `Inverse' Experimental Framework to Estimate Market Efficiency
Thomas Asikis, Heinrich H. Nax
Digital marketplaces processing billions of dollars annually represent critical infrastructure in sociotechnical ecosystems, yet their performance optimization lacks principled mea…
Minimizing Volatility: Optimal Adjustment with Evolving Feasibility Constraints
Simon Jantschgi, Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski +1
Minimizing volatility and adjustment costs is of central importance in many economic environments, yet it is often complicated by evolving feasibility constraints. We study a decis…
Invariant Price of Anarchy: a Metric for Welfarist Traffic Control
Ilia Shilov, Mingjia He, Heinrich H. Nax +3
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a standard metric for quantifying inefficiency in socio-technical systems, widely used to guide policies like traffic tolling. Conventional PoA analys…
Algorithmic Collusion is Algorithm Orchestration
Cesare Carissimo, Fryderyk Falniowski, Siavash Rahimi +1
We propose a fresh `meta-game' perspective on the problem of algorithmic collusion in pricing games a la Bertrand. Economists have interpreted the fact that algorithms can learn to…
'Dark pressure': A metric that yields distance-independent circular orbital speed in deep space with 'tunable' total mass
C. Mallary
In general relativity, the tangential speed of objects in stable circular orbits is not uniquely described by the orbital radius and the mass present inside the orbital radius. Thi…
Welfare and Cost Aggregation for Multi-Agent Control: When to Choose Which Social Cost Function, and Why?
Ilia Shilov, Ezzat Elokda, Sophie Hall +2
Many multi-agent socio-technical systems rely on aggregating heterogeneous agents' costs into a social cost function (SCF) to coordinate resource allocation in domains like energy…
Cycles and collusion in congestion games under Q-learning
Cesare Carissimo, Jan Nagler, Heinrich Nax
We investigate the dynamics of Q-learning in a class of generalized Braess paradox games. These games represent an important class of network routing games where the associated sta…
Learning to Steer Markovian Agents under Model Uncertainty
Jiawei Huang, Vinzenz Thoma, Zebang Shen +2
Designing incentives for an adapting population is a ubiquitous problem in a wide array of economic applications and beyond. In this work, we study how to design additional rewards…
Dynamic Resource Allocation with Karma: An Experimental Study
Ezzat Elokda, Saverio Bolognani, Florian Dörfler +1
We perform a behavioral experiment of karma, a class of mechanisms for repeated resource allocation with attractive fairness and efficiency properties, in theory. Individuals in th…
Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets
Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski
We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over time and are drawn from a continuum of types. The cost of matching a client and provider varies, so a social p…
Stability of cooperation under image scoring in group interactions
Heinrich H. Nax, Matjaz Perc, Attila Szolnoki +1
Image scoring sustains cooperation in the repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma through indirect reciprocity, even though defection is the uniquely dominant selfish behaviour in t…
Directional learning and the provisioning of public goods
Heinrich H. Nax, Matjaz Perc
We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack str…