4 citations · 11 across the 25 of their papers we have counts for
23 papers · 1 filter
Just-in-Time Resale in an Ahead-of-Time Auction for Faster Execution
Burak Öz, Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel +1
We study Arbitrum's Timeboost auction, an ahead-of-time mechanism that sells a 200ms ordering advantage in an otherwise first-come, first-served transaction ordering policy. The ma…
Timing Games: Probabilistic backrunning and spam
Bruno Mazorra, Christoph Schlegel, Akaki Mamageishvili
There are players who compete by timing their actions. An opportunity appears randomly on a time interval. Whoever takes an action the fastest after the opportunity has arisen…
TimeBoost: Do Ahead-of-Time Auctions Work?
Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, Ko Sunghun +2
We study the performance of the TimeBoost auction, by comparing cumulative fixed time markout of fast lane trades over the TimeBoost interval to bids for the fast lane. Such compar…
Economic Censorship Games in Fraud Proofs
Ben Berger, Edward W. Felten, Akaki Mamageishvili +1
Optimistic rollups rely on fraud proofs -- interactive protocols executed on Ethereum to resolve conflicting claims about the rollup's state -- to scale Ethereum securely. To mitig…
On Sybil-proof Mechanisms
Minghao Pan, Bruno Mazorra, Christoph Schlegel +1
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof direct mechanism is a second price auction…
Searcher Competition in Block Building
Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, Benny Sudakov +1
We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition, in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as…
Shared Sequencing and Latency Competition as a Noisy Contest
Akaki Mamageishvili, Jan Christoph Schlegel
We study shared sequencing for different chains from an economic angle. We introduce a minimal non-trivial model that captures cross-domain arbitrageurs' behavior and compare the p…
EIP-4844 Economics and Rollup Strategies
Davide Crapis, Edward W. Felten, Akaki Mamageishvili
We study the economics of the Ethereum improvement proposal 4844 and its effect on rollups' data posting strategies. Rollups' cost consists of two parts: data posting and delay. In…
Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators
Akaki Mamageishvili, Edward W. Felten
We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game without outside parties e…
Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding in Transaction Ordering
Akaki Mamageishvili, Mahimna Kelkar, Jan Christoph Schlegel +1
We design TimeBoost: a practical transaction ordering policy for rollup sequencers that takes into account both transaction timestamps and bids; it works by creating a score from t…
Axioms for Constant Function Market Makers
Jan Christoph Schlegel, Mateusz Kwaśnicki, Akaki Mamageishvili
We study axiomatic foundations for different classes of constant-function automated market makers (CFMMs). We focus particularly on separability and on different invariance propert…
Staking Pools on Blockchains
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Manvir Schneider
On several proof-of-stake blockchains, agents engaged in validating transactions can open a pool to which others can delegate their stake in order to earn higher returns. We develo…
On-Chain Auctions with Deposits
Jan Christoph Schlegel, Akaki Mamageishvili
Second-price auctions with deposits are frequently used in blockchain environments. An auction takes place on-chain: bidders deposit an amount that fully covers their bid (but poss…
Vote Delegation with Unknown Preferences
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Manvir Schneider
We examine vote delegation when preferences of agents are private information. One group of agents (delegators) does not want to participate in voting and abstains under convention…
Vote Delegation and Misbehavior
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Manvir Schneider
We study vote delegation with "well-behaving" and "misbehaving" agents and compare it with conventional voting. Typical examples for vote delegation are validation or governance ta…
Mechanism Design and Blockchains
Akaki Mamageishvili, Jan Christoph Schlegel
Game theory is often used as a tool to analyze decentralized systems and their properties, in particular, blockchains. In this note, we take the opposite view. We argue that blockc…
Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: The Devil's Menu and the Market for Lemons
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Oriol Tejada
Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but otherwise they are indistinguishable from real ballots. By means of a game-theoretical model, we show that decoy ballots may no…
No truthful mechanism can be better than approximate for two natural problems
Stefano Leucci, Akaki Mamageishvili, Paolo Penna
This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which the trivial approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possible. That is, no truthful mechanism can be be…
Sequential Solutions in Machine Scheduling Games
Cong Chen, Paul Giessler, Akaki Mamageishvili +2
We consider the classical machine scheduling, where jobs need to be scheduled on machines, and where job scheduled on machine contributes to…
Tighter Bounds on the Inefficiency Ratio of Stable Equilibria in Load Balancing Games
Akaki Mamageishvili, Paolo Penna
In this paper we study the inefficiency ratio of stable equilibria in load balancing games introduced by Asadpour and Saberi [3]. We prove tighter lower and upper bounds of 7/6 and…
Multicast Network Design Game on a Ring
Akaki Mamageishvili, Matus Mihalak
In this paper we study quality measures of different solution concepts for the multicast network design game on a ring topology. We recall from the literature a lower bound of 4/3…
An Upper Bound on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games
Akaki Mamageishvili, Matúš Mihalák, Simone Montemezzani
In the network design game with players, every player chooses a path in an edge-weighted graph to connect her pair of terminals, sharing costs of the edges on her path with all…
Tree Nash Equilibria in the Network Creation Game
Akaki Mamageishvili, Matus Mihalak, Dominik Muller
In the network creation game with n vertices, every vertex (a player) buys a set of adjacent edges, each at a fixed amount α > 0. It has been conjectured that for α >= n, every Nas…