5 papers
Vote Delegation with Unknown Preferences
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Manvir Schneider
We examine vote delegation when preferences of agents are private information. One group of agents (delegators) does not want to participate in voting and abstains under convention…
Vote Delegation and Misbehavior
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Manvir Schneider
We study vote delegation with "well-behaving" and "misbehaving" agents and compare it with conventional voting. Typical examples for vote delegation are validation or governance ta…
Mechanism Design and Blockchains
Akaki Mamageishvili, Jan Christoph Schlegel
Game theory is often used as a tool to analyze decentralized systems and their properties, in particular, blockchains. In this note, we take the opposite view. We argue that blockc…
Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: The Devil's Menu and the Market for Lemons
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Oriol Tejada
Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but otherwise they are indistinguishable from real ballots. By means of a game-theoretical model, we show that decoy ballots may no…
Multicast Network Design Game on a Ring
Akaki Mamageishvili, Matus Mihalak
In this paper we study quality measures of different solution concepts for the multicast network design game on a ring topology. We recall from the literature a lower bound of 4/3…