4 citations · 11 across the 25 of their papers we have counts for
33 papers
Priority Gas Auction Cadence and Searcher Competition: Evidence from Flashblocks on Base
Pranay Anchuri, Edward W. Felten, Akaki Mamageishvili
Flashblocks divide a block's priority gas auction into shorter sequential auctions that commit transaction order before the block is complete. We ask how this auction cadence affec…
Price Elasticity of Gas Demand on L1 and L2: Evidence from Ethereum and Arbitrum
Pranay Anchuri, Akaki Mamageishvili
We estimate the causal price elasticity of gas demand on Ethereum mainnet (L1) and Arbitrum One (L2), a quantity necessary for calibrating fee mechanism simulations, evaluating res…
Just-in-Time Resale in an Ahead-of-Time Auction for Faster Execution
Burak Öz, Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel +1
We study Arbitrum's Timeboost auction, an ahead-of-time mechanism that sells a 200ms ordering advantage in an otherwise first-come, first-served transaction ordering policy. The ma…
Timing Games: Probabilistic backrunning and spam
Bruno Mazorra, Christoph Schlegel, Akaki Mamageishvili
There are players who compete by timing their actions. An opportunity appears randomly on a time interval. Whoever takes an action the fastest after the opportunity has arisen…
TimeBoost: Do Ahead-of-Time Auctions Work?
Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, Ko Sunghun +2
We study the performance of the TimeBoost auction, by comparing cumulative fixed time markout of fast lane trades over the TimeBoost interval to bids for the fast lane. Such compar…
The Cost of Secure Restaking vs. Proof-of-Stake
Akaki Mamageishvili, Benny Sudakov
We compare the total capital efficiency of secure restaking and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols. First, we consider the sufficient condition for the restaking graph to be secure. Th…
Economic Censorship Games in Fraud Proofs
Ben Berger, Edward W. Felten, Akaki Mamageishvili +1
Optimistic rollups rely on fraud proofs -- interactive protocols executed on Ethereum to resolve conflicting claims about the rollup's state -- to scale Ethereum securely. To mitig…
MEV Capture Through Time-Advantaged Arbitrage
Robin Fritsch, Maria Inês Silva, Akaki Mamageishvili +2
As blockchains begin processing significant economic activity, the ability to include and order transactions inevitably becomes highly valuable, a concept known as Maximal Extracta…
On Sybil-proof Mechanisms
Minghao Pan, Bruno Mazorra, Christoph Schlegel +1
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof direct mechanism is a second price auction…
Searcher Competition in Block Building
Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, Benny Sudakov +1
We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition, in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as…
BoLD: Fast and Cheap Dispute Resolution
Mario M. Alvarez, Henry Arneson, Ben Berger +12
BoLD is a new dispute resolution protocol that is designed to replace the originally deployed Arbitrum dispute resolution protocol. Unlike that protocol, BoLD is resistant to delay…
Crowdsearch
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Fikri Pitsuwan
A common economic process is crowdsearch, wherein a group of agents is invited to search for a valuable object, such as a software vulnerability or a proof-of-work nonce. We study…
Shared Sequencing and Latency Competition as a Noisy Contest
Akaki Mamageishvili, Jan Christoph Schlegel
We study shared sequencing for different chains from an economic angle. We introduce a minimal non-trivial model that captures cross-domain arbitrageurs' behavior and compare the p…
EIP-4844 Economics and Rollup Strategies
Davide Crapis, Edward W. Felten, Akaki Mamageishvili
We study the economics of the Ethereum improvement proposal 4844 and its effect on rollups' data posting strategies. Rollups' cost consists of two parts: data posting and delay. In…
Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators
Akaki Mamageishvili, Edward W. Felten
We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game without outside parties e…
Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding in Transaction Ordering
Akaki Mamageishvili, Mahimna Kelkar, Jan Christoph Schlegel +1
We design TimeBoost: a practical transaction ordering policy for rollup sequencers that takes into account both transaction timestamps and bids; it works by creating a score from t…
Decentralized Attack Search and the Design of Bug Bounty Schemes
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Fikri Pitsuwan
Systems and blockchains often have security vulnerabilities and can be attacked by adversaries, with potentially significant negative consequences. Therefore, infrastructure provid…
Efficient Rollup Batch Posting Strategy on Base Layer
Akaki Mamageishvili, Edward W. Felten
We design efficient and robust algorithms for the batch posting of rollup chain calldata on the base layer chain, using tools from operations research. We relate the costs of posti…
Axioms for Constant Function Market Makers
Jan Christoph Schlegel, Mateusz Kwaśnicki, Akaki Mamageishvili
We study axiomatic foundations for different classes of constant-function automated market makers (CFMMs). We focus particularly on separability and on different invariance propert…
Staking Pools on Blockchains
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Manvir Schneider
On several proof-of-stake blockchains, agents engaged in validating transactions can open a pool to which others can delegate their stake in order to earn higher returns. We develo…
On-Chain Auctions with Deposits
Jan Christoph Schlegel, Akaki Mamageishvili
Second-price auctions with deposits are frequently used in blockchain environments. An auction takes place on-chain: bidders deposit an amount that fully covers their bid (but poss…
Vote Delegation with Unknown Preferences
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Manvir Schneider
We examine vote delegation when preferences of agents are private information. One group of agents (delegators) does not want to participate in voting and abstains under convention…
Vote Delegation and Misbehavior
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Manvir Schneider
We study vote delegation with "well-behaving" and "misbehaving" agents and compare it with conventional voting. Typical examples for vote delegation are validation or governance ta…
FileBounty: Fair Data Exchange
Simon Janin, Kaihua Qin, Akaki Mamageishvili +1
Digital contents are typically sold online through centralized and custodian marketplaces, which requires the trading partners to trust a central entity. We present FileBounty, a f…