6 papers
Online Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur +1
We introduce and study an online variant of the multi-agent contract model. In our model, agents arrive one-by-one and are active with a certain probability. Upon arrival of agent…
When Contracts Get Complex: Information-Theoretic Barriers
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur +1
In the combinatorial-action contract model (Dütting et al., FOCS'21) a principal delegates the execution of a complex project to an agent, who can choose any subset from a given s…
Black-Box Lifting and Robustness Theorems for Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Multi-agent contract design has largely evaluated contracts through the lens of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). This focus, however, is not without loss: In general, the principal can…
Combinatorial Contract Design: Recent Progress and Emerging Frontiers
Michal Feldman
Contract theory studies how a principal can incentivize agents to exert costly, unobservable effort through performance-based payments. While classical economic models provide eleg…
Contract Design for Sequential Actions
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
We introduce a novel model of contracts with combinatorial actions that accounts for sequential and adaptive agent behavior. As in the standard model, a principal delegates the exe…
Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A…