9 papers
Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation
Michal Feldman, Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan +1
We study fair mechanisms for the classic job scheduling problem on unrelated machines with the objective of minimizing the makespan. This problem is equivalent to minimizing the eg…
Epistemic Pairwise Maximin Share
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Yael Nissan +1
We introduce epistemic pairwise maximin share (EPMMS), a new fairness notion for fair division of indivisible goods. Two fundamental notions in this setting are envy-freeness up to…
Combinatorial Contracts Through Demand Types
Elizabeth Baldwin, Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman +1
In the combinatorial action model of contract design, a principal delegates a complex project to an agent, incentivizing a subset of actions from a ground set of actions, via a…
Ultra Efficient Contracts: Pushing the Boundaries of Tractable Contract Design
Michal Feldman, Liat Yashin
We study the optimal contract problem in the \emph{combinatorial actions} framework of Dütting et al.~[FOCS'21], where a principal delegates a project to an agent who chooses a su…
Equal-Pay Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
We study multi-agent contract design, where a principal incentivizes a team of agents to take costly actions that jointly determine the project success via a combinatorial reward f…
Succinct Ambiguous Contracts
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Yarden Rashti
Real-world contracts are often ambiguous. While recent work by Dütting, Feldman, Peretz, and Samuelson (EC 2023, Econometrica 2024) demonstrates that ambiguous contracts can yield…