From the 1 of 8 linked papers with an AI index.
4 papers · 1 filter
Designing Pairwise-Stable Agent Seating Arrangements
Frederik Glitzner
The paper studies how a central planner can design the underlying graph on which agents with ordinal preferences are seated, aiming to achieve pairwise‑stable arrangements while ba…
Near-Feasible Stable Matchings: Incentives and Optimality
Frederik Glitzner
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm…
Stable Matching with Deviators and Conformists
Frederik Glitzner, Augustine Kwanashie, David Manlove
In the Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching alwa…
A Minimax Perspective on Almost-Stable Matchings
Frederik Glitzner, David Manlove
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to ach…