From the 1 of 7 linked papers with an AI index.
7 papers
Designing Pairwise-Stable Agent Seating Arrangements
Frederik Glitzner
The paper studies how a central planner can design the underlying graph on which agents with ordinal preferences are seated, aiming to achieve pairwise‑stable arrangements while ba…
Near-Feasible Stable Matchings: Incentives and Optimality
Frederik Glitzner
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm…
Stable Matching with Deviators and Conformists
Frederik Glitzner, David Manlove
In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable m…
A Minimax Perspective on Almost-Stable Matchings
Frederik Glitzner, David Manlove
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to ach…
Unsolvability and Beyond in Many-To-Many Non-Bipartite Stable Matching
Frederik Glitzner, David Manlove
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on st…
Perspectives on Unsolvability in the Roommates Problem
Frederik Glitzner, David Manlove
In the well-studied Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of agents into pairs, where no two agents prefer each other over their assigned partners. However, some inst…