6 papers
Learning Real-Life Approval Elections
Piotr Faliszewski, Åukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk +3
We study the independent approval model (IAM) for approval elections, where each candidate has its own approval probability and is approved independently of the other ones. This mo…
How to Tamper with a Parliament: Strategic Campaigns in Apportionment Elections
Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, MichaÅ Furdyna +6
In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. Most parliaments are assembled using apportionment methods that distribute the seats bas…
Project Submission Games in Participatory Budgeting
Piotr Faliszewski, Åukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk +2
We introduce the framework of project submission games, capturing the behavior of project proposers in participatory budgeting (and multiwinner elections). Here, each proposer subm…
Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees
Pallavi Jain, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk
In a recently introduced model of successive committee elections (Bredereck et al., AAAI-20) for a given set of ordinal or approval preferences one aims to find a sequence of a giv…
Putting Fair Division on the Map
Paula Böhm, Robert Bredereck, Paul Gölz +2
The fair division of indivisible goods is not only a subject of theoretical research, but also an important problem in practice, with solutions being offered on several online plat…
Computing Efficient Envy-Free Partial Allocations of Indivisible Goods
Robert Bredereck, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Junjie Luo +1
Envy-freeness is one of the most prominent fairness concepts in the allocation of indivisible goods. Even though trivial envy-free allocations always exist, rich literature shows t…