activity
20122026
most citedReducing the rank of a matroid

13 citations · 66 across the 39 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2015Show all

8 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2015

Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction

Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai, Adrian Vetta

The simultaneous multiple-round auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) are the two primary mechanisms used to sell bandwidth. Under truthful bidding, the SMRA is…

cs.GT2015★ 10 cited

Pricing Policies for Selling Indivisible Storable Goods to Strategic Consumers

Gerardo Berbeglia, Gautam Rayaprolu, Adrian Vetta

We study the dynamic pricing problem faced by a monopolistic retailer who sells a storable product to forward-looking consumers. In this framework, the two major pricing policies (…

cs.GT2015

On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai, Christoph Hunkenschröder +1

Since the 1990s spectrum auctions have been implemented world-wide. This has provided for a practical examination of an assortment of auction mechanisms and, amongst these, two sim…

cs.CC2015★ 3 cited

Testing Consumer Rationality using Perfect Graphs and Oriented Discs

Shant Boodaghians, Adrian Vetta

Given a consumer data-set, the axioms of revealed preference proffer a binary test for rational behaviour. A natural (non-binary) measure of the degree of rationality exhibited by…

cs.DS2015★ 11 cited

The Inapproximability of Maximum Single-Sink Unsplittable, Priority and Confluent Flow Problems

F. Bruce Shepherd, Adrian Vetta

We consider single-sink network flow problems. An instance consists of a capacitated graph (directed or undirected), a sink node and a set of demands that we want to send to th…

cs.GT2015★ 4 cited

The Combinatorial World (of Auctions) According to GARP

Shant Boodaghians, Adrian Vetta

Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage…

cs.GT2015★ 7 cited

Large Supports are required for Well-Supported Nash Equilibria

Yogesh Anbalagan, Hao Huang, Shachar Lovett +3

We prove that for any constant and any , there exist bimatrix win-lose games for which every -WSNE requires supports of cardinality greater than . To do this, we pro…

cs.GT2015★ 6 cited

Coalition Games on Interaction Graphs: A Horticultural Perspective

Nicolas Bousquet, Zhentao Li, Adrian Vetta

We examine cooperative games where the viability of a coalition is determined by whether or not its members have the ability to communicate amongst themselves independently of non-…