activity
20122022
most citedThe Inapproximability of Maximum Single-Sink Unsplittable, Priority and Confluent Flow Problems

11 citations · 24 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

13 papers

econ.TH2022

The Blocker Postulates for Measures of Voting Power

Arash Abizadeh, Adrian Vetta

A proposed measure of voting power should satisfy two conditions to be plausible: first, it must be conceptually justified, capturing the intuitive meaning of what voting power is;…

cs.GT2021

An Improved Bound for the Tree Conjecture in Network Creation Games

Jack Dippel, Adrian Vetta

We study Nash equilibria in the network creation game of Fabrikant et al.[10]. In this game a vertex can buy an edge to another vertex for a cost of , and the objective of each…

cs.GT2021

Two Birds With One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers

Vishnu V. Narayan, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta

We study the question of dividing a collection of indivisible goods amongst a set of agents. The main objective of research in the area is to achieve one of two goals: fairness or…

cs.GT2021

Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming

Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta

We study the performance of the Empirical Revenue Maximizing (ERM) mechanism in a single-item, single-seller, single-buyer setting. We assume the buyer's valuation is drawn from a…

cs.GT2020

The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions

Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta

We study the efficiency of sequential multiunit auctions with two-buyers and complete information. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly $1/…

cs.GT2020

Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding

Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta

We study equilibria in two-buyer sequential second-price (or first-price) auctions for identical goods. Buyers have weakly decreasing incremental values, and we make a behavioural…