1 citations · 2 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Mechanism Design with Moral Bidders
Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
A rapidly growing literature on lying in behavioral economics and psychology shows that individuals often do not lie even when lying maximizes their utility. In this work, we attem…
Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods
Sigal Oren, Oren Roth
We consider trading indivisible and easily transferable \emph{durable goods}, which are goods that an agent can receive, use, and trade again for a different good. This is often th…
Stochastic Model for Sunk Cost Bias
Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Manish Raghavan +1
We present a novel model for capturing the behavior of an agent exhibiting sunk-cost bias in a stochastic environment. Agents exhibiting sunk-cost bias take into account the effort…
Optimal Stopping with Behaviorally Biased Agents: The Role of Loss Aversion and Changing Reference Points
Jon Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg, Sigal Oren
People are often reluctant to sell a house, or shares of stock, below the price at which they originally bought it. While this is generally not consistent with rational utility max…