28 citations · 55 across the 19 of their papers we have counts for
24 papers
Auction Design with a Bit of Information
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Jacob D. Leshno +1
Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can access a binary signal about two bidders` joint values. We explore what kind of information is most valuable to the seller by studying…
AI-Assisted Decision Making with Human Learning
Gali Noti, Kate Donahue, Jon Kleinberg +1
AI systems increasingly support human decision-making. In many cases, despite the algorithm's superior performance, the final decision remains in human hands. For example, an AI ma…
Planning Against a Prophet: A Graph-Theoretic Framework for Making Sequential Decisions
Andrés Cristi, Sigal Oren
We devise a general graph-theoretic framework for studying prophet inequalities. In this framework, an agent traverses a directed acyclic graph from a starting node to a target…
Modeling reputation-based behavioral biases in school choice
Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Emily Ryu +1
A fundamental component in the theoretical school choice literature is the problem a student faces in deciding which schools to apply to. Recent models have considered a set of sch…
Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees
Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Jan Vondrak
We study incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize the Nash Social Welfare. Since traditional incentive-compatible mechanisms cannot maximize the Nash Social Welfare even appro…
Mechanism Design with Moral Bidders
Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
A rapidly growing literature on lying in behavioral economics and psychology shows that individuals often do not lie even when lying maximizes their utility. In this work, we attem…