106 citations · 636 across the 106 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Social Status and Badge Design
Nicole Immorlica, Greg Stoddard, Vasilis Syrgkanis
Many websites rely on user-generated content to provide value to consumers. These websites typically incentivize participation by awarding users badges based on their contributions…
Draft Auctions
Nikhil R. Devanur, Jamie Morgenstern, Vasilis Syrgkanis
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer…
Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions
Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis
We study the efficiency of sequential first-price item auctions at (subgame perfect) equilibrium. This auction format has recently attracted much attention, with previous work esta…
Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments
Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Milan Vojnovic
We consider collaborative systems where users make contributions across multiple available projects and are rewarded for their contributions in individual projects according to a l…
Strong Price of Anarchy and Coalitional Dynamics
Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos +1
We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of no…
Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions
Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis
The classic result of Bulow and Klemperer \cite{BK96} says that in a single-item auction recruiting one more bidder and running the Vickrey auction achieves a higher revenue than t…
Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan +1
We study the design of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms in single parameter domains, for the objective of optimizing social efficiency as measured by social cost. In the pr…