106 citations · 636 across the 106 of their papers we have counts for
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Composable and Efficient Mechanisms
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even when players participate in multiple different mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. W…
Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions
Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Omer Tamuz
We obtain revenue guarantees for the simple pricing mechanism of a single posted price, in terms of a natural parameter of the distribution of buyers' valuations. Our revenue guara…
Bayesian Sequential Auctions
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
In many natural settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not simultaneous. In such auctions, future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the…
Bayesian Games and the Smoothness Framework
Vasilis Syrgkanis
We consider a general class of Bayesian Games where each players utility depends on his type (possibly multidimensional) and on the strategy profile and where players' types are di…