26 citations · 50 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
A Stable-Set Bound and Maximal Numbers of Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games
Constantin Ickstadt, Thorsten Theobald, Bernhard von Stengel
Quint and Shubik (1997) conjectured that a non-degenerate n-by-n game has at most 2^n-1 Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. The conjecture is true for n at most 4 but false for n=…
Finding Nash Equilibria of Two-Player Games
Bernhard von Stengel
This paper is an exposition of algorithms for finding one or all equilibria of a bimatrix game (a two-player game in strategic form) in the style of a chapter in a graduate textboo…
Unit Vector Games
Rahul Savani, Bernhard von Stengel
McLennan and Tourky (2010) showed that "imitation games" provide a new view of the computation of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with the Lemke-Howson algorithm. In an imitation…
Game Theory Explorer - Software for the Applied Game Theorist
Rahul Savani, Bernhard von Stengel
This paper presents the "Game Theory Explorer" software tool to create and analyze games as models of strategic interaction. A game in extensive or strategic form is created and ni…
Rank-1 Games With Exponentially Many Nash Equilibria
Bernhard von Stengel
The rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) is the rank of the matrix A+B. We give a construction of rank-1 games with exponentially many equilibria, which answers an open problem by Kannan…