26 citations · 50 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
A Stable-Set Bound and Maximal Numbers of Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games
Constantin Ickstadt, Thorsten Theobald, Bernhard von Stengel
Quint and Shubik (1997) conjectured that a non-degenerate n-by-n game has at most 2^n-1 Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. The conjecture is true for n at most 4 but false for n=…
Finding Nash Equilibria of Two-Player Games
Bernhard von Stengel
This paper is an exposition of algorithms for finding one or all equilibria of a bimatrix game (a two-player game in strategic form) in the style of a chapter in a graduate textboo…
Unit Vector Games
Rahul Savani, Bernhard von Stengel
McLennan and Tourky (2010) showed that "imitation games" provide a new view of the computation of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with the Lemke-Howson algorithm. In an imitation…
Game Theory Explorer - Software for the Applied Game Theorist
Rahul Savani, Bernhard von Stengel
This paper presents the "Game Theory Explorer" software tool to create and analyze games as models of strategic interaction. A game in extensive or strategic form is created and ni…
Rank-1 Games With Exponentially Many Nash Equilibria
Bernhard von Stengel
The rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) is the rank of the matrix A+B. We give a construction of rank-1 games with exponentially many equilibria, which answers an open problem by Kannan…
Oriented Euler Complexes and Signed Perfect Matchings
László A. Végh, Bernhard von Stengel
This paper presents "oriented pivoting systems" as an abstract framework for complementary pivoting. It gives a unified simple proof that the endpoints of complementary pivoting pa…