8 citations · 15 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers · 1 filter
Welfare effects of strategic voting under scoring rules
Egor Ianovski, Daria Teplova, Valeriia Kuka
Strategic voting, or manipulation, is the process by which a voter misrepresents his preferences in an attempt to elect an outcome that he considers preferable to the outcome under…
Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda
Daria Teplova, Egor Ianovski
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem established that no non-trivial voting rule is strategy-proof, but that does not mean that all voting rules are equally susceptible to strategic m…
Computing the proportional veto core
Egor Ianovski, Aleksei Y. Kondratev
In social choice there often arises a conflict between the majority principle (the search for a candidate that is as good as possible for as many voters as possible), and the prote…
How should we score athletes and candidates: geometric scoring rules
Aleksei Y. Kondratev, Egor Ianovski, Alexander S. Nesterov
Scoring rules are widely used to rank athletes in sports and candidates in elections. Each position in each individual ranking is worth a certain number of points; the total sum of…
Electing a committee with dominance constraints
Egor Ianovski
We consider the problem of electing a committee of candidates, subject to some constraints as to what this committee is supposed to look like. In our framework, the candidates…
Complexity of mixed equilibria in Boolean games
Egor Ianovski
Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a truth assignment to a set of propos…
Two statements of the Duggan-Schwartz theorem
Egor Ianovski
The Duggan-Schwartz theorem (Duggan and Schwartz, 1992) is a famous result concerning strategy-proof social choice correspondences, often stated as "A social choice correspondence…
Manipulability of consular election rules
Egor Ianovski, Mark C. Wilson
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is a cornerstone of social choice theory, stating that an onto social choice function cannot be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial if the num…
DValue for Boolean games is EXP-complete
Egor Ianovski
We show that the following problem is EXP-complete: given a rational v and a two player, zero-sum Boolean game G determine whether the value of G is at least v. The proof is via a…
EGuaranteeNash for Boolean Games is NEXP-Hard
Egor Ianovski, Luke Ong
Boolean games are an expressive and natural formalism through which to investigate problems of strategic interaction in multiagent systems. Although they have been widely studied,…
Cake Cutting Mechanisms
Egor Ianovski
We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presen…