2 citations · 2 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda
Daria Teplova, Egor Ianovski
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem established that no non-trivial voting rule is strategy-proof, but that does not mean that all voting rules are equally susceptible to strategic m…
Detecting corruption in single-bidder auctions via positive-unlabelled learning
Natalya Goryunova, Artem Baklanov, Egor Ianovski
In research and policy-making guidelines, the single-bidder rate is a commonly used proxy of corruption in public procurement used but ipso facto this is not evidence of a corrupt…
Electing a committee with dominance constraints
Egor Ianovski
We consider the problem of electing a committee of candidates, subject to some constraints as to what this committee is supposed to look like. In our framework, the candidates…
Complexity of mixed equilibria in Boolean games
Egor Ianovski
Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a truth assignment to a set of propos…
Computable Component-wise Reducibility
Egor Ianovski
We consider equivalence relations and preorders complete for various levels of the arithmetical hierarchy under computable, component-wise reducibility. We show that implication in…