59 citations · 192 across the 56 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Exponential Segregation in a Two-Dimensional Schelling Model with Tolerant Individuals
Nicole Immorlica, Robert Kleinberg, Brendan Lucier +1
We prove that the two-dimensional Schelling segregation model yields monochromatic regions of size exponential in the area of individuals' neighborhoods, provided that the toleranc…
Randomization beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction
Hu Fu, Nicole Immolica, Brendan Lucier +1
Designing revenue optimal auctions for selling an item to symmetric bidders is a fundamental problem in mechanism design. Myerson (1981) shows that the second price auction wit…
The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments
Nick Arnosti, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-know…
The Price of Anarchy in Large Games
Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier +2
Game-theoretic models relevant for computer science applications usually feature a large number of players. The goal of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for boundin…